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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1: The purpose of the study 
During the last decade or so, the tendency in the world has been towards a more 
regionalized system. In the wake of the resurgence and relative successes of the 
European project, focus has increasingly been directed towards other similar regional 
integration projects. Regional organizations and Free Trade Areas (FTAs) have been 
emerging all over, including, among others, Mercosur in South/Latin America, 
NAFTA in North America, SADC in Southern Africa and, perhaps most significantly, 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Southeast Asia. In this paper, 
I will focus on ASEAN. 
ASEAN is an organization which today includes all ten countries geographically 
considered Southeast Asian. It is in many ways very different from other significant 
regional organizations, such as the European Union. Where the EU for a good while 
has enjoyed considerable supranational powers over its members, as well as a fairly 
bureaucratic system with heavily formalized institutions, ASEAN is a very different 
story: It is vaguely defined by its own declarations, it has no formal supranational 
powers, and it hardly has any formal institutions (at least in the way Europeans tend to 
see it). Yet, in many ways, ASEAN must be considered a success, both by surviving 
the Cold War and the Asian Crisis, and by keeping member states from going to war 
on one another for as long as the Association has existed. The economic growth in the 
region has been amazing, although ASEAN should not be credited directly for that 
growth. Also, in the years following the Asian Crisis, after which ASEAN was left in 
shambles, new developments took place. ASEAN leaders seemed to realize that the 
Association needed to stake out a new direction. One of the major steps taken in such a 
direction might very well be the formalization of the three pillars of ASEAN. With an 
economic, a security-political and a socio-cultural pillar on which integration was to 
be built, ASEAN might just be able to renew its dedication to the regional project. In 
fact, that ASEAN was not abandoned altogether after its failure to deal appropriately 
with the Asian Crisis, should be evidence that dedication to the Association is still 
high. Against this backdrop, it is interesting to observe how the major regional powers 
approach such a regional project. In my thesis, I will therefore study the relation 
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between the regional level – ASEAN – and the national level, here represented by two 
of the leading members; Indonesia and Malaysia. Therefore, I have chosen to work 
with the following main research question: 
“How do Indonesia and Malaysia approach the regional integration project of 
which they are part, and how are their policies affected by their participation in 
ASEAN?” 
 
1.2: Defining the thesis 
1.2.1: Some key concepts 
Regionalism vs. regionalisation 
Although I obviously will return to this at later stages, I will just say some words 
about the key concepts carried within the main research question. First and foremost, it 
is necessary to define regional integration. As will become clear in the next chapter, 
the common notion of a region being an area defined by mere geographic proximity is 
not nearly sufficient for our purposes. Instead, we assume that a region must imply 
something more – including both increased interaction between members, and possibly 
the developing a common regional identity, besides (often) being situated in the same 
geographical proximity. I will return to this later. 
Second it is necessary to define some broad indicators on regional integration. 
There are two concepts that come in handy in this regard. Regionalism refers to an 
active political project or programme, while regionalisation refers to a process of 
increased transactions (mainly economic) between states within the same geographic 
area (Hveem 1999). The subtle, but important difference is that regional integration 
based on regionalism is actively pushed forward by the members, while regionalisation 
is something that may happen because of practical and pragmatic reasons, but may 
also be a product of regionalism. 
 
Selecting the cases 
In order to answer the question above, I have chosen to focus on two of the three 
mentioned pillars of ASEAN, namely the economic pillar and the security pillar. It is 
important to note in this regard that I have chosen to use the term “pillar” rather 
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loosely in my thesis – not by examining these directly, but rather by focusing on two 
cases, each case representing its pillar. It is furthermore important to note that there are 
also other cases of cooperation sorting under the respective pillars. For instance, the 
ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) is a significant initiative built upon the economic 
pillar. The Association’s negotiations with its neighbours over the possible 
establishment of new extra-ASEAN FTAs are also considered a vital part of ASEAN 
Economic Cooperation (AEC). Likewise, the increased importance of the ASEAN 
Regional Forum is a vital part of ASEAN Security Cooperation (ASC). Thus, it is not 
in the literal sense of the notion of the ASEAN pillars that I have chosen to conduct 
this study. Still, I will argue that my cases are representative for the contexts from 
which they have been selected. 
 
1.2.2: The dimensions of the thesis 
In order to answer the above research question, some dimensions along which I 
can organize my research must be established. I have chosen to do so by posting four 
questions that I believe must be asked and attempted answered. These four questions 
are based upon four hypotheses, which I will seek to either falsify or verify throughout 
the empirical and analytical sections. These four questions and hypotheses, to which I 
will return in Chapter 6, hopefully will make me able to answer the main research 
question by the end of this thesis, in order to draw some conclusions to the main 
research question. 
 
Q1: Which are the approaches to the regional project adopted by Indonesia and 
Malaysia? 
In every development in any organization, there are leaders and there are 
stragglers, and in this case, my working hypothesis is that “both Malaysia and 
Indonesia have been acting as leaders in order to shape regional integration” (H1). 
Which role have they put upon themselves in the two very different cases? Have they 
been acting as leaders, neutrally, or as stragglers? I will try to compare them to each 
other, and to other cases outlined other places in this paper, such as in Chapter 3. 
Hopefully, this will contribute to answering the main research question. 
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Q2: Is it the formal or the informal mechanisms of ASEAN that influence Indonesia 
and Malaysia the strongest? 
The formal mechanisms of ASEAN should in this regard be defined as the formal 
institutions of ASEAN, such as the annual ASEAN Summit, the Ministers Meetings 
and the Secretariat. Certain treaties, such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation must 
be considered formal mechanisms as well, along with specific organs designed to 
supervise the workings of AFTA and ARF etc. The informal mechanisms of ASEAN 
are harder to define, and it is not imperative that we do so either. Instead, suffice it to 
say that such mechanisms might appear in various forms. For instance, when Malaysia 
and the Philippines came to a peaceful agreement over the Sabah-province during the 
1970s it was not within the formal ASEAN institutions, but due to the fact that 
ASEAN remained an instrumental part of both countries’ foreign policies it could still 
be argued that it was resolved within an informal ASEAN framework. Indonesia’s part 
in the solving of the Cambodian crisis is another example of diplomacy conducted 
within an ASEAN context but outside the formal institutions of the Association. Thus, 
unilateral or bilateral agreements or actions must also be defined as informal 
mechanisms, in the sense that they take place outside of the formal ASEAN 
framework. I have included this question because it seems intrinsically logical to 
assume that much of the interaction between ASEAN’s members take place through 
informal channels. This is due to the fact that ASEAN as a regional organization has 
very few formal institutions that are capable of such transactions. Despite its 
institutional shortcomings, it has somehow been able to remain an important part of its 
members’ foreign policies, and my hypothesis is “that the perseverance of ASEAN 
might be due to the informal framework of cooperation that the Association offers” 
(H2). 
 
Q3: Is it security or economy that best defines the countries’ position on ASEAN? 
Much of the literature on ASEAN has been preoccupied with the economic 
success of the countries of the region. Certainly, that the rapid growth and relative 
success of its members has contributed to the preservation of the Association for 
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almost 40 years is hardly disputable. Still, I will argue that “it is security-political 
issues that define the countries’ position on and approach towards regional 
integration” (H3). If this is true, however, it seems somewhat ironic that it is economic 
integration that has developed the farthest. On the other hand, perhaps it has been 
easier to promote regionalism in the field least important and harder to do the same in 
the area of security and sovereignty. Indeed, is it perhaps possible to say that security 
is a precondition for economic integration? I shall examine this relation closer in my 
analysis. 
 
Q4: Is it possible that Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s approach to ASEAN might be 
moving towards two-level intergovernmentalism? 
If Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s policies towards ASEAN largely used to be 
decided by authoritarian President Suharto and semi-authoritarian Prime Minister 
Mahathir respectively, is it possible that the transition to democracy in Indonesia and 
the change of Prime Minister in Malaysia might lead to a change in these countries’ 
approaches to ASEAN? My hypothesis is that this might be the case (H4), at least in 
the medium to long run. With the new wave of democracy that is washing over both 
Indonesia and Malaysia, this is a question that must be taken into consideration. As 
democracy is consolidated, the domestic level with political groups, parliamentarians, 
lobbyists and NGOs will participate in these countries’ decision-making. If this is the 
case, then Indonesian and Malaysian policies towards ASEAN will no longer be 
decided by one or a select few politicians or leaders, but rather also by political 
processes on the domestic level. It is presumably still too early to reject the importance 
of the respective heads of government, but both the new importance of human security 
and other factors suggests that this might be about to change. 
 
1.2.3: The timeframe of the study 
Given the scope of this thesis, it is important to define the timeframe within 
which to study the two cases outlined above. Luckily, both cases have a ‘natural’ 
timeframe: The establishment of AFTA was first discussed in late 1991 and formally 
put into operation in January 1993. This makes 1991 the natural year to start, despite 
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the existence of an ASEAN Preferential Trade Area since 1977, upon which the AFTA 
was based. For the Myanmar situation, the timeframe is much the same. As shall 
become apparent in later chapters, the term constructive engagement in Southeast Asia 
may be backdated to 1991 (International IDEA 2001: xv), and marks the natural 
starting point for me to begin the analysis of this case. Although it might be perfectly 
valid to argue for other starting points, I have chosen the period from 1991 until today 
as the period in which my analysis will take place. Much emphasis, however, will be 
put upon the later years – especially in the case of Myanmar. 
 
1.3: Design, methodology and sources 
1.3.1: Design 
Multiple-case study - The cases and the embedded units of analysis 
“[…] case studies are the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions are being 
posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real life context” (Yin 2003: 1). 
 
I have chosen to utilize the properties of a case study in this paper. A case study 
is a methodological approach that typically is intensive by nature. An intensive study, 
as opposed to an extensive study, creates the opportunity to delve deep into one or few 
subjects or cases, whereas the extensive approach is more concerned about shallow, 
but broad results (Hellevik 1999: 95). Furthermore, the use of case studies is often 
motivated more by special interest for the subject of study, rather than trying to 
develop general insights based on the case (Andersen 1997: 94). 
In this thesis, I have chosen to work with two cases – the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA) and ASEAN’s approach towards the situation in Myanmar 
(subsequently called the “Myanmar Crisis”) – in order to shed some light upon the 
quest for regional integration in Southeast Asia. To further narrow down my study, I 
have chosen to analyze the approach of two countries – Indonesia and Malaysia – to 
regional integration through their approach to economic and security integration. 
According to Yin, the sort of design sketched out above constitutes a so-called type 4 
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design – an embedded multiple case study1. In this context, this involves two cases, 
each with two embedded units of analysis. By analyzing the actions and behaviour of 
the two embedded units in each case, I hope to draw some valid conclusions about the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
 
Figure 1: A type 4 case design: An embedded multiple-case study. Adapted from Yin (2003: 40) 
 
As stated by Yin, case studies are appropriate especially when questions 
beginning with “how” and “why” are being asked, such as the one I asked in the 
beginning of this chapter. Also, ASEAN and regional integration in Southeast Asia 
qualify for a qualitative case design due to the contemporariness of the integration 
process, and the total absence of control of events by the investigator. Furthermore, 
when considering a single-case design vs. a multiple-case design, Yin states that 
“among these designs, most multiple-case designs are likely to be stronger than single-
case designs” (Yin 2003: 19). On a more substantial note, I have chosen these two 
cases for both practical and theoretical reasons. First and foremost, they represent 
ASEAN cooperation in the two most prominent areas of integration, namely (political) 
economy and security. At the Bali Summit in 2003, these areas of integration were 
fortified as the main pillars of integration, along with a socio-cultural pillar. Second, I 
                                                 
1 The other three types are holistic and embedded single-case designs, and holistic multiple-case designs. The 
difference between holistic and embedded designs lie in their approach to the case: While embedded designs 
analyses the cases through embedded units, holistic designs regards the entire case as a whole (as the name 
implies). See Yin for a more detailed review. 
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realized that it would be difficult to draw any valid conclusions about ASEAN and the 
way the Association’s members approach integration, based on only one of these two 
main sectors. This has to do with the clear separation between the sectors in terms of 
integration in the region – ASEAN has traditionally kept security and economy 
relatively detached from each other. 
 
The relation between theory and empirical evidence 
With regard to the relation between theory and the empirical evidence of the case, 
Andersen (1997) divides case studies into three categories; a-theoretical case studies, 
theory interpretative case studies, and theory developing case studies. The a-
theoretical is defined as a case study motivated by interest in the case, or as stated by 
Arend Lijphardt: “They are entirely descriptive and move in a theoretical vacuum” 
(Lijphardt in Andersen 1997: 62). Theory developing case studies, on the other hand, 
seeks to develop either completely new theories, or at the very least develop and/or 
supplement existing theoretical frameworks. The last category, which I use, is the 
interpretative case study. Andersen defines this type as a kind of case study where the 
study is motivated by interest for the case, and where the subject of study at the same 
time is seen as a typical example of one, or several, classes of phenomena about which 
there already exist a certain knowledge (ibid: 68). This kind of case study is not aimed 
at developing new theory or generalizing its findings, but is instead very useful in 
order to structure and organize empirical material by use of existing theories and 
concepts.  
 
The problem of having two very different cases 
It should be no doubt by now that the two selected cases are indeed very 
different, both substantially and theoretically. This is also why it is extremely 
important to define some variables or dimensions at an early stage. In that way, one 
will know what to look for even though the data material in the two cases might be 
very different. These variables, as identified in an earlier section in this chapter, also 
form the basis for the analysis conducted in chapter 6. By following such a ‘guide’, 
comparing the cases should not be too problematic. Some issues might still arise, and 
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one must be careful to keep these in mind. In particular, one must be mindful of the 
difference in the context of the two forms of regional integration. Although both 
economic integration and security integration take place within the same organization, 
the two fields have been virtually isolated from each other thus far. The easiness with 
which AFTA has been implemented must thus not be indiscriminately compared to the 
apparent reluctance to deepen security integration. Indeed, the context in each case 
must be consulted and the conclusions weighted in order to give valid answers. 
Despite the possible pitfalls on the way to drawing valid conclusions based on the 
comparison of these two cases, there are some important substantial elements that link 
the cases very much together, creating a sort of interdepence between them. I will 
return to this in chapter 6. Indeed, I will argue later in the paper, that the new notion of 
economic security in the future will act as a bridge between security and economy. 
 
1.3.3: Sources 
According to Robert K. Yin, there are six main sources of evidence which are of 
use during a case study. Of these six, this thesis rests upon two main sources, namely 
documentation and archival records. Sources under “documentation” include 
communiqués, written reports of events, administrative documents and newspaper 
clippings (Yin 2003: 86). In my case, such documents are official ASEAN declarations 
and treaties, joint communiqués and press releases related to ARF Meetings, Summits 
and Ministers Meetings, as well as newspaper articles. Most of the newspaper articles 
used in this thesis are from the Asia Times Online edition, which proves an invaluable 
source of input in this regard. “Archival records” include organizational charts, maps 
and survey data (ibid: 89). In my thesis, this type covers the CEPT packages and 
census data such as data on trade and foreign direct investment. Furthermore, I use 
existing literature such as articles, studies and books extensively in my study. When 
using documents and archival records as sources, it is important to be aware of their 
strengths and weaknesses. Among others, Yin mentions the stability and broadness of 
coverage as main strengths of documents. That a source is stable means that it can be 
reviewed repeatedly, and it is clearly a strength when it covers long time spans, a 
number of events, and many settings (ibid: 86). There are weaknesses related to the 
9 
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use of documents too, perhaps the most important being issues regarding bias – either 
so-called reporting bias or biased selectivity. The former kind of bias occurs when the 
author’s bias is reflected in the source, while the second occurs for instance when a 
collection is incomplete (ibid: 86). When it comes to archival records, the strengths 
and weaknesses are more or less the same, according to Yin, but unique for this kind 
of source is its preciseness and quantitative character. This is a major strength, and is 
also valid in our case, namely the CEPT packages and ASEAN census data. The major 
weakness with this kind of source/evidence is the possibility that accessibility to the 
source is restricted, for instance due to privacy reasons (ibid: 86). 
 
 
1.4. Outline of the thesis 
Before I proceed with the thesis, I will in this section briefly outline the layout of 
this paper. In the next chapter, I examine the theoretical frameworks and concepts that 
may accompany me throughout the subsequent analysis. It consists of three parts. First 
I include a brief and general summary of regionalism, i.e. historically and 
conceptually. Secondly I examine very briefly the economic and political science 
theories that are commonplace to use when trying to explain regional integration. 
Finally, I present the theoretical view that I believe have the most explanation power 
in my case, as well as placing ASEAN into this theoretical context. Chapter 3 presents 
the region and provides the backdrop for the two cases examined in the two following 
chapters. The main emphasis in this chapter lies on ASEAN’s historical development, 
with special focus on the roles of Malaysia and Indonesia respectively. Major 
developments are for instance the establishment of ASEAN, the Cambodian crisis, the 
expansion of the Association, and the Asian Financial Crisis. 
In the chapters 4 and 5 I present my two cases. Chapter 4 is dedicated to the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). It aims at identifying Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s 
dedication to economic integration in ASEAN, and does so through two main sections. 
First it does so through a thorough examination of the Common Effective Preferential 
Tariff (CEPT) Scheme, and the practical steps the two countries have undertaken to 
fulfil their obligations to the CEPT and the AFTA. Secondly, I take a look at intra-
regional trade and investment as indicators on regionalisation (and perhaps 
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regionalism). Chapter 5 presents the case of the Myanmar crisis (although it may not 
have been a crisis at the start of the constructive engagement strategy, at least not for 
ASEAN). The chapter is organized after the following fashion: First I give a brief 
summary of the major developments in Myanmar since 1988, including Myanmar’s 
relationship with and membership in ASEAN. I then proceed to argue that the 
Myanmar crisis most certainly presents a very real security threat to ASEAN if left 
unsolved. In this argument I introduce four non-traditional security areas, such as 
defined by, among others, Richard Ullman (1983). The new security concept includes 
human security, economic security, societal security and environmental security. I 
place special emphasis on human security and economic security, which will be 
further elaborated in chapter 6, in which I present my analysis. It is structured as 
outlined in this chapter, with two separate sections, one for each case. I try to answer 
each of the four questions posted as mentioned, for both cases respectively. Hopefully, 
I will then be able to draw some conclusions, which I will present in chapter 7. I also 
try to compare the two cases, briefly revisiting the potential problems of having two 
very different cases to compare. Chapter 7 offers some conclusions, and also dares to 
make a few guesses at what the future might bring with regard to the workings of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
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Chapter 2: A theoretical framework 
2.1: What is a region? 
Before venturing into the exciting world of regionalism, it is useful to spend a 
few moments trying to define the term region. What first springs to mind when one 
hears the word ‘region’ is often something within a geographical context. People are 
used to thinking of a region as a geographical entity, including either a group of 
interconnecting countries or suchlike. This narrow definition of a region is hardly 
adequate for our purposes, which is illustrated repeatedly throughout the empirical 
writings of the political science tradition. NATO – a regional alliance originally 
defined by proximity to the North Atlantic – today includes Mediterranean nations like 
Italy, Greece and Turkey, neither of which have an Atlantic coastline. It is obvious that 
we also need to include other factors than mere geographic proximity if we are to 
define “region” in an adequate way. In the literature, political scientist and 
constructivist Peter J. Katzenstein (2002), based on the work of Karl Deutsch, defines 
a region as: 
“…a group of countries markedly interdependent over a wide range of different 
dimensions. This pattern of interdependence is often, but not always, indicated by 
patterns of economic and political transactions and social communications that 
differentiate groups of countries. Hence regions do not exist as material objects in the 
world. (…) Regions are also social and cognitive constructs that are rooted in political 
practice” (ibid: 105). 
 
For Katzenstein, interdependence between states in the areas of economy and 
politics, are the central concept that more often than not defines a region. This explains 
how the eastern European countries and countries like Greece, Italy and Turkey have 
been allowed membership in NATO. The increasing interdependence between the 
members surpasses geographical proximity to the North Atlantic as a criterion for 
membership. The notion of interdependence is important in Asia as well, although 
Southeast Asia and ASEAN are somewhat easier to identify by geographical 
conditions than other state constellations. Stuart Harris (2002) defines region with 
regard to Asia by emphasizing important variables such as economic factors and 
political factors: 
“In defining the Asian region, as with any region, various characteristics are important, 
notably geography, and economic and political/security interdepencies” (ibid: 120). 
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Finally, Kanishka Jayasuryia claims that a region 
“…is a set of cognitive practises shaped by language and political discourse, which 
through the creation of concepts, metaphors, analogies, determine how the region is 
defined; these serve to define the actors who are included (and excluded) within the 
region and thereby enable the emergence of  regional identity” (Katzenstein 2002: 105-
106). 
 
Jayasuriya’s definition suggests that the concept of a region may not be inherent 
in states’ behaviour and manner of thinking. Being included as a member of a 
grouping of states contributes to an emerging regional identity. In the rest of my thesis, 
I am content with basing my work upon the three definitions above, and the 
assumption that a region (generally, and ASEAN especially) is defined not only by 
geographical proximity, but also by differing degrees of interdependence between 
states in various areas, such as economy, politics and security. 
 
2.2: A history of regionalism 
It is common to divide the history of regionalism into two periods, one beginning 
in the late 1950s and ebbing out by the mid 1970s, and one beginning with the end of 
the Cold War in the late 1980s that is still going on. The first period was mainly 
characterized by great power rivalry, in true realist spirit. The relative success of the 
European Community was considered a template after which other regional projects 
might be fashioned. When this did not happen, the first period of regionalism more or 
less died out. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union saw a 
change in this trend. Countries could no longer choose between the United States and 
the Soviet Union, and had to fend for themselves instead. At the same time, the United 
States’ power faltered somewhat with the lack of a clear military threat, which gave an 
opening for the creation of a multitude of FTAs all over the world. Also, the explosive 
expansion of Globalism created new or reinforced patterns of interdependence that 
facilitated the formation of new regional groupings.  
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2.2.1: Regionalism and regionalization 
One should, at this point, take notice of there being a significant, though often 
neglected, distinction between regionalism and regionalisation. According to Helge 
Hveem, 
“...regionalism refers to a programme, an ideology, to a situation where there exists a 
clear idea of a region, a set of goals and values associated with a specific project that an 
identifiable group of actors wish to realize. Regionalization, on the other hand, is the 
actual process of increasing exchange, contact and coordination and so on within a 
certain region” (Hveem 2003: 83). 
 
The difference is important: Whereas regionalism is an active political project or 
program, that may or may not succeed, regionalization is more of a pragmatic process 
marked by increasing transactions between states within a region. Indeed, increased 
intra-regional trade might, for instance, be caused by a trend causing companies to 
seek to expand its regional base in order to reap the economic advantages of 
economies of scale (Hveem 1999: 87). However, the dynamics between regionalism 
and regionalization represents a two-way relationship. There might be regionalism 
without regionalization, and there might be regionalization without regionalism. 
However, it is just as probable that regionalism will lead to regionalization, in the form 
of increased transactions between the states included in the project. In a successful 
regional project, increased political, economical, and social transactions supposedly 
follow naturally from regionalism. Equally, pragmatic regionalization might just as 
likely lead to political regionalism. 
 
2.3: Theoretical approaches 
2.3.1: Economic theories 
The Flying Geese Paradigm 
The theory of the Flying Geese pattern of development (FG) is one of the theories 
most often applied to Asia. It was first formulated by Japanese economist Kaname 
Akamatsu in the 1930s (translated to English in the early 1960s), and is based on the 
flying pattern (an inverted V, or a plough shape) of emigrating geese. The logic is 
simple: The geese following the leader fly much easier through due to the slipstream 
created by the one flying in front. Akamatsu, who studied the Japanese textile 
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industries, argued that the same principles are applicable to Japan, and the economic 
catching-up process of East and Southeast Asia. Japan, the leading goose, 
industrialized early, and then proceeded to export products and technologies into other 
East Asian and Southeast Asian countries. These countries were then more easily able 
to acquire their own capital goods industries by copying and integrating Japanese 
technologies, in the wake of the Japanese industrialization (Bernard and Ravenhill 
1995: 172-173).  
How then does this facilitate regional integration? The link between Japanese 
regional leadership and regional integration is dependent upon assumptions of the 
importance and influence of Japanese TNCs and their overseas activities, such as sub-
contracting, joint ventures, FDI and other similar activities. The establishment of such 
production networks throughout the region creates increased interdependence between 
the states within the region, which again often interprets as a sign of regional 
integration (Kasahara 2004: 2). Indeed, FG theory presumes that these TNCs may act 
as an important channel for the technology transfer required by the catching up 
process, and that this gradual transformation of regional industrial activities tends to 
strengthen regional linkages. However, FG theory also assumes that the leading/first-
tier countries will move the production of products no longer profitable at home to 
second-tier economies where production costs are lower, and then import these 
products instead of producing them. The failure of the East Asian first-tier states to 
absorb nothing but a relatively small share of products produced in the second-tier 
states serves to weaken such inter-regional linkages (ibid: 21). Another shortcoming of 
the FG theory is its failure to consider the importance of China and overseas Chinese 
networks in the development and integration of Southeast Asia. 
 
Trade integration 
Besides the Flying Geese paradigm, Bela Balassa’s conceptualization of the five 
levels of economic integration, which is a revised and expanded version of Jacob 
Viner’s customs union theory, is one of theories most often applied in order to explain 
ASEAN’s economic integration. In brief, however, Balassa claims that economic 
regionalism may take a variety of forms, dependent on, among other things, the level 
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of economic discrimination – i.e. inter-regional trade barriers and non-tariff trade 
barriers – and the level of economic integration. Thus, Viner’s customs union 
“…constitutes the foundation of this theory, which involves the creation of, in linear 
succession, of increasingly more advanced stages of economic integration: preferential 
trade area, free trade area, customs union, common market and political union” (Schulz, 
Söderbaum and Öjendal 2001: 10). 
 
An interesting side notion to the theoretical contributions of Balassa and Viner is 
presented by Ronald Wonnacott through the so-called hub-and-spokes (H&S) system. 
Wonnacott analysed the different free trade area relations of the United States. He 
concluded that the American-Mexican FTA and the American-Canadien FTA, which 
were independent of each other, overlapped and thus resembled a system where the 
United States is the hub, and Mexico and Canada respectively are the spokes 
(Kowalczyk and Wonnacott 1992: 3). In his example, Wonnacott realized the potential 
of the two FTAs melting together into one large FTA – today’s NAFTA. In our case, 
ASEAN is currently busy creating bilateral free trade areas with India, South Korea, 
Australia, New Zealand and Japan, and has already concluded such an agreement with 
China. These potential FTAs are all independent of each other, but will all, if realized, 
be interconnected through ASEAN. Should such a giant hub-and-spokes system 
evolve into a true FTA that includes all the mentioned countries, the result would 
encompass more than half the world’s population. 
 
2.3.2: Political science theories 
Realism 
Realism (or rather neorealism) is probably the most influential paradigm within 
the field of International Relations, and thus includes several theories that seek to 
explain regional integration. Common for all realists is the assumption that the world 
state system is anarchic, that all states participate in constant rivalry with each other, 
and that the state is the central and dominant rational actor. It is up to each and every 
state to position itself in this system. According to Hveem (1996: 151), it is reasonable 
to talk about two categories of explanations within the realist tradition. First there is 
the balancing version. It argues that states act in order to balance other states that they 
perceive as threats or rivals. The motive for states to bundle together in a regional 
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grouping is thus to achieve strength in order to claim or maintain a position in the 
world system where showing strength is the only credible way of self-assertion. Then 
there is what may be called the imperial version of integration, namely the theory of 
hegemonic stability. This form of regional cooperation is organized in order to 
promote the interests (i.e. economic and strategic interests) of a hegemonic power in 
the global system. The resulting regional groupings will then be considered as a part of 
the hegemon’s sphere of influence. Related to this argument, many realists believe that 
the world system in the future will be centred around three security blocs; a US-led 
North-American alliance, a Germany- and France-led European alliance and a Japan-
led East Asian alliance (Hveem 1996). China’s role in such a tripolar structure is yet to 
be examined. Realists, as opposed to economists, do not carry any ambitions of an 
open global system. According to them, any such major alliances, or blocs, will 
compete with each other for power and position, possibly causing an arms race due to 
the need to balance and counter-balance. 
 
Intergovernmentalism 
Another perspective possibly explaining regionalism and regional integration is 
intergovernmentalism, which is often associated with Andrew Moravcsik. Grossly 
simplified, the supporters of this theory of integration argue that international 
cooperation (or in this case regional integration) is based upon interstate bargains 
between the heads of governments of the leading states involved (Moravcsik 1991: 
25). The state is viewed, as argued by both realism and neorealism, as the leading 
actor, represented by the heads of governments, along with small groups of close 
advisors and ministers. The principle of upholding of national sovereignty is guarded 
jealously by these political leaders, which clearly limits the possibilities for any 
supranational institutions to form and cooperation to deepen (Mattli 1999: 28-29). 
Much of the critique against the intergovernmentalist theory of regional integration has 
been directed at the apparent lack of regard for domestic politics. Critics argue that 
political leaders hardly operate in a vacuum, but rather depend upon domestic political 
processes before negotiating in the regional forum. This critique seems well founded, 
and to meet his critics, Moravcsik has formulated what he calls liberal 
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intergovernmentalism. This new theory seeks to explain regional integration not only 
by what may be called “celebrated intergovernmental bargains”, i.e. major interstate 
decisions that supposedly marks the convergence of state interests, but also by first 
including a stage in which the national interests are determined (ibid: 29-30). It thus 
comes out as a version of Robert Putnam’s two-level game: While international 
negotiations indeed may take place between the heads of governments of sovereign 
states according to their best interests, the negotiation position of a state is the result of 
domestic politics and negotiations (Hveem 1996: 154). 
 
Functionalism 
Functionalism is another highly relevant theory seeking to explain interstate 
integration. It was first proposed by David Mitrany in the 1950s and 60s, and argued 
that global integration would facilitate the growth of peace. This, Mitrany claimed, 
would best be achieved through what he called the “pragmatic functional approach” 
(Mattli 1999: 21). Mitrany’s solution was based upon the assumption that integration 
was most likely to happen through functional, or sectoral, cooperation between 
countries in low-politics areas such as transport and communication, water, energy, 
education and other similar areas. By the establishment and institutionalisation of such 
supranational bureaus, economic welfare would increase due to the creation of 
economies of scale. With successful integration within specific sectors, spill-over 
effects would be created. This effect would draw people’s loyalties away from the 
sovereign national state, making it redundant, and instead transfer sovereignty from 
the old territorialized authority to the new supranational (global) authority. The 
primary actors in this normative theory are supranational institutions, created not by 
politicians, but by such actions as joint management in areas such as those listed above 
(ibid: 22).  
 
Neofunctionalism 
Neofunctionalism, associated with Ernest Haas, presents a refined version of the 
functionalist paradigm. Whereas the old functionalism mainly was concerned with 
actors above the national level, the new functionalism also conceded that actors just 
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below the nation-state had an important role. The actors above the nation-state are still 
supranational institutions, created by sectoral integration. The actors below the nation-
state include interest-groups, politicians and governments. These actors are important 
because they may facilitate and initiate the establishment of such supranational 
institutions (Hveem 1996: 153). Support and endorsement from governments and 
political authorities are indeed quite essential if effective institutions are to be created. 
A second point of departure is that the neofunctionalists believe that institutions must 
be designed deliberately to lead to further integration, whereas the classical 
functionalists believed that integration could be de-coupled from politics and that it 
would automatically happen (Schulz, Söderbaum and Öjendal 2001: 8-9). The process 
of integration, as described by neofunctionalism, may be divided into three related 
concepts, namely functional spillover, political spillover and upgrading of common 
interests (Mattli 1999: 25). The high degree of interdepence between the economic 
sectors in a modern industrial society causes any integration attempt in one sector to 
affect other sectors, and thus spillover is achieved. According to Mattli, political 
spillover refers to the process of “adaptive behaviour […] of national interest groups 
and political parties in response to sectoral integration” (ibid: 26). The third element of 
neofunctionalism, the upgrading of common interests, describes the process of states 
swapping concessions when experiencing difficulties in arriving at a common policy. 
The states recognize the need to uphold a certain level of interdependence between 
them, so as to preserve the process of integration, and thus upgrade their common 
interests by swapping concessions in related fields. Such institutionalised swapping of 
concessions contributes to strengthen the power of the central institutions by 
regulating egoistical state behaviour and instead induce them to seek compromises 
(ibid). 
 
2.4: General concepts – three perspectives on regional integration 
While all the above mentioned theories very possibly may contribute to 
understand a regional congregation of states such as ASEAN, it is also very important 
to keep in mind the driving forces and motivations for the creation and the 
preservation of the regionalist project. Based upon the theories outlined above, we can 
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derive three categories, or perspectives, of regionalism that may all contribute to 
explain ASEAN. 
The first perspective is based on the theories of hegemonic leadership, and 
assumes that the interest of a hegemon is the driving force behind and within regional 
organizations. Based on the theories listed above, it is evident that both the economic 
Flying Geese theory and the realist versions of hegemonic power and interest theories 
sort under this perspective. Further, when talking about hegemonic power and interest, 
one can separate two different versions; namely organizations driven by the interests 
and powers of an external actor, and organizations based on the leadership of internal 
actors. In the case of ASEAN, economists tend to rely on Japan as the external 
inspiration as the leader goose, while political scientists are more divided in their 
analysis. Some claim that a nation like Indonesia in some aspects may be considered a 
hegemon within the sub region, while other focus on the endorsement and strong 
presence of the United States in the region as a driving force of ASEAN. 
The second perspective, the interstatist/-nationalist perspective, focus on the 
relations between states and governments and includes, among others, Moravscik’s 
intergovernmentalism, Mitrany’s functionalism and Haas’ neofunctionalism (also, to a 
lesser extent; federalism). In this perspective, the driving forces of regionalism and 
integration are the result of political will and cooperation between states (also 
governments/state leaders) as rational actors. In the case of neofunctionalism, as 
argued by Karin Knudsen (1987), this might also be the case of ASEAN. The recent 
formalization of the three pillars of ASEAN might be understood in a neofunctionalist 
perspective, the three pillars representing different sectors in which integration can 
take place to ensure spill-over effects to other sectors. The empiric evidence from 
ASEAN might also point in this direction, as the organization to a large extent is 
driven by the political leadership of the respective members. It might also be argued 
that not even Indonesia qualifies as a true hegemon, and that the organization relies on 
consensus between the states as no single actor has the power alone to force through 
decisions. Another factor supports this perspective, namely that ASEAN to a large 
extent is a project of the political leadership because it raises little popular debate 
within its respective member nations. 
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The third and final perspective may be called the transnationalist perspective 
because it adopts liberalism’s assumptions of the power of transnational companies, 
NGOs and transnational perceptions of a regional identity as possible explanatory 
factors to regionalism. Theories to be placed beneath this flag include certain 
refinements of the Flying Geese-theory, in which the role of Japanese production 
networks and transnational companies’ interests in Southeast Asia are emphasized. 
Classic economic Product Cycle theories also sort under this header. While NGOs in 
Southeast Asia most likely are somewhat limited in the case of exerting influence and 
pressure on the integration process, the power of the great corporations (especially 
Japanese ones, and the accommodation of these) quite possibly may be a force to be 
reckoned with and should not be underestimated in the further analysis. Although I 
have not included this latter factor specifically in my review of some of the theories 
seeking to explain regional integration, it may none the less become of growing 
importance. This is mainly due to recent developments in the region, as it seems that a 
new ‘wave’ of democratization is sweeping especially Malaysia and Indonesia. With 
transparent and well consolidated democracy, the importance of NGOs and other non-
governmental actors increases, and it might just be possible that these new voices on 
the domestic level might very well influence what happens on the supranational level. 
 
2.5: ASEAN in a theoretical context 
While many of the theories aiming to explain regional integration have been 
based on the experience of the European Union, ASEAN is a different experience 
altogether. My argument is that while none of these theoretical contributions are 
perfect, it can neither be said that any of them are completely useless. I will in this 
section argue that it is reasonable to examine ASEAN in an intergovernmentalist 
framework, instead of for instance in a neofunctionalist or trade integrationalist one. I 
will substantiate this claim in this section. 
To really understand ASEAN, one must examine two central mechanisms. First 
and foremost, as in any analysis, one must define the most important actors. Who 
drives the ASEAN regional project forwards? In this case, evidence suggests that the 
imperative actors are the respective sovereign states. This deviates somewhat from 
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traditional realist thinking, for instance, as it is not the state as a rational unitary actor 
as such that appears to be the main actor, but rather the heads of government in the 
respective state. Indeed, in a large majority of the literature on ASEAN, focus is put on 
specific cases, or developments, in which either the respective heads of government 
are central, or one of these leader’s closest associates (foreign ministers, 
economic/financial ministers etc.). Although this is not by itself sufficient evidence to 
conclude that other factors are not important in our case, it more than suggests the 
importance of state leaders in this matter of region-building. Although this will be 
tested as this thesis moves along, it seems reasonable to stick (at least for the time 
being) to the respective heads of government as the driving force of ASEAN. This 
explicit state-led integration, with a clear focus on the state leaders, is a trademark of 
traditional intergovernmentalism. 
Secondly, it is important to recognize ASEAN’s modus operandi. Although much 
has happened quite recently, ASEAN has traditionally had a low degree of 
institutionalisation. It has a very modest secretariat, and operates mainly through 
annual summits in which the respective heads of governments meet to discuss ASEAN 
matters. Consensus is the defining word at these summits, and the Association itself 
has no goal of creating a binding legal framework to which its members must abide. 
Indeed, it has no aim whatsoever, to build any supranational institutions, capable of 
overruling national sovereignty (Rosamond 2001). In this way, it deviates substantially 
from neofunctionalism. For neofunctionalists, integration is a very gradual and 
continuous process, in which the actors constantly work towards the dismantling of 
sovereignty and the establishment of transnational functional regions. Furthermore, 
neofunctionalists regards politicians as important in one regard – as facilitators and 
negotiators who work towards the establishment of such supranational institutions. 
Indeed, something resembling a neofunctionalist approach has been tried in ASEAN. 
The creation of joint industrial projects might clearly be interpreted as an attempt at 
functional integration. Sadly enough these attempts failed within a short period of 
time. Instead, ASEAN’s institutional development appears strikingly similar to what 
intergovernmentalists call celebrated intergovernmental bargains. Put shortly, any 
major institutional (or functional) development takes place at one of the ASEAN 
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summits, where it has been negotiated until consensus has been reached. This is 
clearly different from how for example the European Union works, where a 
supranational parliament (and other institutions with supranational powers) may at any 
given time pass new regulations and laws. 
Let me also present my reason for choosing intergovernmentalism over trade 
integration theory. The reason is simple: Classic trade integration theory (that of Jacob 
Viner and Bela Balassa) completely fails to consider the political aspect of integration. 
It merely states that regional economic integration is a result of a collective 
dismantling of trade barriers such as tariffs, but makes no attempt at explaining how 
this happens. Intergovernmentalism, along with most other political science 
explanations, offers a clear modus operandi for such developments, as explained 
earlier. 
While pre-crisis ASEAN may indeed fit well within a traditional 
intergovernmentalist framework, there are signs today that the Association is moving 
towards something that resembles a neo-intergovernmentalist model. Two main 
developments that are related substantiate this claim. First there is the recent wave of 
democratization that has swept over Southeast Asia, with Indonesia as the most 
important exponent. Although Malaysia has been more or less democratic since 
independence, Prime Minister Mahathir enjoyed an extended personal power base. 
Thus, it could be said that these two countries’ approach to the regional project was 
very much state led. With new regimes in place in both countries, however, the sub-
national level has appeared to become more visible. This is only natural. Most 
recently, this new level of influence was reflected by several prominent members of 
parliament in several ASEAN countries2. They demanded that Myanmar should not be 
allowed to assume Chairmanship of ASEAN in 2006 unless the military junta releases 
opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, and introduces 
political reforms. If this is a real change, and not mere window-dressing to appease 
Western trading partners, it certainly introduces national politicians and political 
processes into the ASEAN framework, to supplement the top-level bargaining. Indeed, 
                                                 
2 Asia Times March 25, 2005 [Online]: Verghese Mathews: ”The Bells Toll on Myanmar”. 
23 
Chapter 2: A theoretical framework  Jens Ottar Stærkebye 
if this is the case, then it fits well within Moravcsik’s two-level intergovernmentalism 
where the national interests are determined at an earlier stage. 
Secondly, and closely dependent on the democratic process, is the new focusing 
on soft security and human rights in Southeast Asia. Both Mahathir and Suharto were 
largely impervious to both Western critics and non governmental human rights watch 
organisations, while the new regimes in the respective countries are not. With the 
situation in Myanmar being as it is, new critical voices have increasingly managed to 
make themselves heard. Alas, it is still too early to conclude with anything in this 
regard, but it is very possible that human security is put higher on the agenda, and even 
in a place where it may challenge traditional notions of security, such as classic state 
sovereignty. Again, the criticism by ASEAN lawmakers against the lack of political 
reform in Myanmar may be interpreted in this direction. Whereas non-interference 
became the shield behind which authoritarian leaders could hide, democracy may now 
become the can-opener through which human security supoprters can make themselves 
heard. This evidence further strengthens the assumption that ASEAN is moving 
towards a liberal (neo-) intergovernmentalist model, where national political (and non-
political) actors participate in determining the state’s preferences. 
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Chapter 3: Presenting the region and ASEAN 
3.1: Southeast Asia – A region of diversity 
There is, quite possibly with the exception of Africa, no region in the world today 
that is as socially, politically, economically and geographically diverse as Southeast 
Asia. It includes the world’s 4th largest state, Indonesia, as well as one of the smallest 
ones, Brunei. Indonesia also has the world’s largest Muslim population. The 
Philippines are predominantly Catholic Christians, while Thailand is mainly Buddhist. 
Singapore ranks high in terms of wealth and GDP pr. capita, and is deemed the 
region’s only true developed industrial state. On the other hand of the scale, countries 
like Laos and Myanmar remains abysmally poor despite rich natural resources. Despite 
the large gap between the top and bottom states in terms of wealth, the region as a 
whole has been among the fastest growing in the world for several decades. In recent 
years, Indonesia has been termed the world’s 3rd largest democracy, although a lot of 
work remains in that department, while Myanmar is one of the world’s most brutal 
military dictatorships. Despite this abundance of sharp contrasts, there has not been a 
war fought on Southeast Asian territory since Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, 
although the occupation lasted until 1991. Among ASEAN members, there has not 
been a war fought for as long as the organization has existed – even after the 
expansion in the latter half of the 1990s. This is an impressive feat, and it is but one of 
the aspects that make ASEAN an interesting subject of study. 
Table 1: The Southeast Asian countries 
Country Population GDP (US$) 
Political 
system 
Ethnic 
majority 
Ethnic 
minorities Major religion 
Other 
religions 
Brunei 0,4 million 4,8 billion 
Constitutional 
sultanate, 
authoritarian 
Malay Chinese Muslim Christian, Buddhist 
Myanmar 42 million 9,6 billion 
Military 
regime, 
authoritarian 
Myanmar Shan, Karen Buddhist Christian, Muslim 
Cambodia 12 million 4, 3 billion 
Constitutional 
monarchy, 
unstable 
democratic 
Khmer Vietnamese Buddhist  
Indonesia 238 million 208,3 billion Republic, democratic Javanese 
Sundanese, 
Chinese Muslim Christian 
Laos 6 million 2 billion 
One-party 
state, 
authoritarian 
Lao Chinese Buddhist Animism 
Malaysia 23 million 103,2 billion 
Parliamentary 
system, semi-
democratic 
Malay Chinese, Indian Muslim Buddhist, Christian 
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The 
Phillippines 86 million 80,6 billion 
Parliamentary 
system, 
democratic 
Malay Chinese Roman Catholic Muslim 
Singapore 4 million 91,3 billion 
Republic, 
semi-
democratic 
Chinese Malay, Indian Buddhist Muslim, Christian 
Thailand 64 million 143,2 billion 
Constitutional 
monarchy, 
democratic 
Thai Chinese Buddhist Muslim 
Vietnam 82 million 39,2 billion 
One-party 
state, 
authoritarian 
Vietnamese Chinese Buddhist Taoism 
Source: The CIA World Fact book, the U.S. Department of State and ASEAN. 
 
3.2: ASEAN 
3.2.1: The Beginning 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formally established 
on August 8 1967 with the signing of the Bangkok Declaration by the Foreign 
Ministers Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, and the Deputy Prime 
Minister of Malaysia. The signing of the declaration marked the beginning of a still 
lasting peaceful era in a region that has sometimes been referred to as a potential 
“Balkans of Asia.” Intentionally short and somewhat vague, the declaration states 
seven aims which are interrelated. One such aim, however, captures very well the 
original purpose of the Association:  
“(The aims and purposes of the Association shall be) […] to accelerate the economic 
growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours 
in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a 
prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations” (The Bangkok 
Declaration 1967). 
 
After the next big summit, held at Bali in 1976, the political area was also 
formally acknowledged as an area of cooperation, through the Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord. One of the reasons for this new formal focus on the political branch was the 
recent developments in Indochina, as the communists seemed to be winning and 
ending the Indochina Wars. The establishing of ASEAN might be interpreted as a 
collective response to the communist threat (Poon-Kim 1977). The Declaration of 
ASEAN Concord was in itself important for several reasons. Mostly because it 
specified the sectors in which integration would be promoted, but also because it lay 
down some guidelines for regular ASEAN Summits (Knudsen 1987: 82). Besides the 
Concord, two more treaties from the Bali Summit became important for ASEAN. The 
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Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which calls for its signatories to collaborate in order 
to achieve regional growth, and the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN 
Secretariat. 
Today, two of the main factors motivating the establishment of ASEAN are 
worth mentioning, apart from it being a reaction to communist expansion in Indochina. 
First, there was the fact that the countries in Southeast Asia suddenly realized that the 
share of their intra-regional trade was ridiculously low. In order to increase intra-
regional trade, the establishment of a preferential trade area (PTA) was agreed on in 
1977, a PTA that would provide the basis of the later ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA). Secondly there was the question of national security and sovereignty. 
According to mainstream regionalism theory, regional integration projects are often (at 
least partly) motivated by the realization that smaller states can only resist pressure 
and interference from stronger external actors through cooperation. The countries in 
the Southeast Asian region are no exemption, and in the Bangkok-declaration the five 
members state that 
“…they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference 
in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance 
with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples” (The Bangkok Declaration 1967). 
 
The question of regional and national sovereignty and the ability to withstand 
external pressure became perhaps the most important reason for the Association’s 
formation and continued existence. All five members of the Association except for 
Thailand had until relatively recently been colonies under the rule of different 
European rulers. Decolonisation had left them all new and tender sovereign states, and 
they were by no means about to let external pressure and interference threaten this 
newly won privilege. Tightening neighbourly relations through the creation of ASEAN 
became one strategy towards continued sovereignty and independence. This was a 
two-dimensional goal. On the one side, ASEAN was supposed to represent the five 
members as a single actor towards the rest of the world, in order to assure regional 
resilience. On the other hand, resilience was also national, and whereas ASEAN was 
meant to protect its members towards outside interference, the same went for the 
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respective ASEAN countries towards each other. The result of this was the guiding 
principle of non-interference, which is even the leading principle today. 
 
Becoming ASEAN-10 
In 1995 Vietnam was officially incorporated into the Association, strengthening 
the prospect for peace and stability in the region considerably (Henderson 1999: 24-
25). The admission of Vietnam into ASEAN has proved important on several 
accounts, but most significantly, it paved the way for Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos, 
which resulted in full membership by the latter two in 1997 and the former in 1999. 
That ASEAN even considered granting the communist states of Vietnam and Laos 
membership is rather significant, given the origin of the Association. This really says 
something about the desire to become a true regional project. On the other hand, it 
must be said that fear of alienating Vietnam was a strong incentive (especially for 
Thailand) when inviting Hanoi to join.  
 
3.2.3: Institutions and organizational structure 
Due to the nature of ASEAN as a forum for trust and confidence building, its 
institutional structure is relatively weak (compared for instance to the European Union 
or NATO). The highest decision-making body is the ASEAN Summit where the heads 
of government of the respective members meet and which has since 1995 been 
convened every year. Related to the ASEAN Summit are the different Ministerial 
Meetings (AMM), as shown in figure 1, where the ministers of different sectors meet 
to discuss cooperation and development in their respective spheres, both with each 
other and with external partners. The Ministers Meeting is in charge of the ASEAN 
Standing Committee, which is responsible for coordinating the work of the 
Association between the annual Ministers Meeting. The ASEAN Secretariat also 
answers to the Ministerial Meetings, with the mandate to “initiate, advice, coordinate, 
and implement ASEAN activities,” and is headed by the Secretary-General.  
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3.2.4: The Bali II Concord and the Three Pillars of ASEAN 
In the aftermath of ASEAN’s poor handling of the 1997-1998 Asian Financial 
Crisis, the need for institutional reforms was imminent. In a report presented at the 
Eight ASEAN Summit held in Pnomh Penh, Cambodia, in 2002, a study group set 
down by the ASEAN+3 (ASEAN plus Japan, China and South Korea) stated that  
“…while growing interdependence among East Asian countries in the age of 
globalization has been further strengthening regional cooperation, the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis has awakened the urgent need for institutionalized cooperation and 
stronger economic integration” (ASEAN 2002a: 3). 
 
Although this conclusion included both ASEAN and its Northeast Asian 
neighbours, deeper regional integration within ASEAN precedes tighter East Asian-
wide integration. At the Bali Summit the following year, a small step was taken in this 
direction. The Bali Concord II declared that an ASEAN Community consisting of 
three pillars, namely the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the ASEAN Security 
Community (ASC) and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), shall be 
established. It is important to notice that these three pillars are only intended to 
provide a framework within which “to achieve a dynamic, cohesive, resilient and 
integrated ASEAN Community.” In that sense, one must not be mistaken in believing 
that ASEAN might move rapidly toward a solution such as the European one. The new 
pillars are not represented by their own administrations and the responsibility for 
implementation of the plans of action still resides with the existing mechanisms and 
institutions of the Association. The ASC, for example, and its implementation, is the 
responsibility of the ASEAN Ministers Meeting. The AMM is then required to report 
to the ASEAN Summit every year on the progress of the ASC. Of the three pillars 
established at the Bali Summit, the AEC is so far the best developed one. It is 
illustrated by several integration projects, for instance the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA), the implementation of the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) and the 
Roadmap for Integration (RIA). 
 
3.3: Indonesia and Malaysia: A comparison 
The relationship between the neighbouring countries Malaysia and Indonesia has 
been one of tension, conflict, cooperation and friendship. On land, the two countries 
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share a common border on the island of Borneo, while the narrow Strait of Malacca 
separates Sumatra from the Malaysian mainland. One of the most important roles of 
ASEAN in the early years was to provide a stable environment in which Indonesia and 
Malaysia could sort out their differences without sorting to violence. As mentioned 
earlier, the background for setting up ASEAN both as an organization to promote 
growth, development and competitiveness, and a as a framework for resolving security 
related issues, was the Indonesian policy of konfrontasi under the Soekarno-regime. 
Confrontation was mainly a result of Indonesian annoyance over a Pan-Malayan 
scheme following the independence of the Federation of Malaya from Britain in 1957 
(Mackie 1974: 3). Indonesian displeasure with Malaysian territorial claims nearly 
ended with a military conflict between the two neighbours. Fortunately, the policy of 
konfrontasi ebbed out with the fall of Soekarno and the ascension to power by General 
Suharto in 1966. Internal matters such as provincial uprisings and riots in Jakarta kept 
the Indonesian military occupied, and made an armed confrontation with Malaysia 
impossible. Instead, the new regime in Jakarta began a policy of rapprochement, 
indicating, among other things, a willingness to accept Malaysian control over 
Northern Borneo (Mackie 1974: 319). The establishment of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations became an important step towards institutionalising this 
rapprochement, and to secure a stable development in the region. 
 
3.3.1: 1967-1980: The early years of cooperation 
Due to several reasons, Indonesia has been the de facto (if not de jure) leader of 
ASEAN since the Association’s establishment in 1967. Jeannie Henderson describes 
the archipelago-state’s importance in these words: 
“Jakarta’s influence stemmed from many sources, including the country’s size, its large 
population, which was greater than that of the other ASEAN countries combined, and 
the legacy of konfrontasi, which had intimidated its neighbours. Indonesia did not 
openly claim a leadership role, but rather approached ASEAN according to the Javanese 
concept of ‘leading from behind’. (…) Indonesia made ASEAN the anchor of its foreign 
policy” (Henderson 1999: 17). 
 
One of the reasons why Indonesia and President Suharto made ASEAN the 
anchor of its foreign policy was the idea that regional autonomy and security was 
paramount to Jakarta’s ambitions to achieve a role as one of the world’s middle 
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powers. Also, its ambitions at the time were to achieve and consolidate a leadership-
role among the other countries of Southeast Asia. In Suharto’s view, regional security 
could only be achieved through regional resilience based on national resilience (Poon-
Kim 1977).  
Malaysia, on its side, had no such advantage. With a moderately sized population 
and economy, the country qualified as a medium range power within the Association. 
Still, Malaysia managed to make its voice heard in several important cases during the 
first decades of ASEAN cooperation, and has also proved its dedication to the 
Association. Before consolidating its position within the Association, however, it first 
had to resolve two important issues with its neighbours. The two conflicts threatening 
to escalate to military confrontations were the defining moments for Malaysian 
ASEAN membership. From the pre-ASEAN konfrontasi waged by Indonesia upon 
Malaysia, it learned that it would be no match for an aggressive and united Indonesia. 
From the Sabah-conflict with the Philippines in the late 60s, it learned that ASEAN, 
although not a formal actor in the conflict, worked to provide an environment for 
peaceful settlements of bilateral quarrels. The Sabah-conflict also clearly demonstrated 
both Malaysia’s and the Philippines’ dedication to the newly born Association.  
Among the earliest and most important developments in ASEAN, the debate over 
the establishment of an ASEAN Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) 
clearly shows Indonesian and Malaysian dedication to the idea of regional resilience. 
Indonesia’s support of the ZOPFAN was paramount to its formal declaration in 1971, 
although Malaysia is credited with its implementation. Suharto wanted to achieve 
neutrality through great power exclusion, while Malaysia preferred to achieve 
neutralization through great power guarantees (Narine 1998). A second illustration of 
the two countries’ attempts at pushing ASEAN in the right direction was the 
negotiations over the establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat at the Bali Summit in 
1976. During the negotiations, Indonesia represented one end of the scale, wanting the 
Secretariat to be given a policy-oriented role and the Secretary-General to be endowed 
with strong power and leadership. Malaysia, on the other end of the scale, wanted the 
Secretariat to be a small and efficient administrative body, with the task of 
coordinating the Association’s work between the Ministerial Meetings (Poon-Kim 
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1977). Thirdly, at the third ASEAN Summit in 1987, Indonesia proposed to make 
ASEAN a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ). The proposal was backed by 
Malaysia, but was met with resistance elsewhere, mainly so as to not alienate the 
nuclear powers that had strategic interests in the region. The Southeast Asia Nuclear 
Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) came into force in 1997, and is an important 
component of the ZOPFAN agreement.  
 
3.3.2: The Cambodian conflict 
Another success for ASEAN in which Indonesia (and to a lesser degree 
Malaysia) took a leading role was during the Cambodean crisis immediately following 
the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978. Immediately after the invasion, the 
ASEAN states adopted a joint position opposing the Vietnamese invasion, fearful of 
further Vietnamese aggression. Malaysia and Indonesia, however, regarded China as 
the greater and more imminent threat to ASEAN territory, and was thus more inclined 
to moderation in the negotiations with Vietnam. To these two states, Vietnam was seen 
as a potential bulwark against Chinese influence. Both states supported the official 
ASEAN view, but would not accept a Thai plan to throw the Vietnamese out of 
Cambodia by force. As the conflict reached a stalemate by the mid 80s, Indonesia 
attempted to bring the conflicting parts together. Despite ASEAN condemnation of the 
Vietnamese occupation, Indonesian Foreign Minister Mokhtar travelled to Ho Chi 
Minh City. Jakarta also held bilateral talks with the regime in Hanoi, trying to settle 
the conflict peacefully (Acharya 2001). In many ways, Indonesia acted on its own in 
this regard, but in order not to alienate Thailand and Singapore, as well as to reinforce 
its informal leadership in the Association, Indonesia hosted a series of informal 
meetings in Jakarta (JIMs) in the late 1980s. Attending these meetings were 
representatives from all major actors in the conflict – the different Cambodian 
factions, ASEAN, Vietnam and Laos. Despite its high level of activity during the 
conflict which dragged on for twelve years, pressure from ASEAN alone could not 
push Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia. Instead, Great Power politics would 
decide on the outcome of the crisis, and at the United Nations’ Paris Peace Conference 
of 1991, a resolution was reached in the Security Council, ensuring Vietnam’s 
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withdrawal from Cambodia within short time, after more than twelve years of 
occupation (Narine 1998).  
 
3.3.3: Recent developments 
Today, Indonesia’s position in ASEAN is weakened, although the country is still 
the largest country in the Association, according to both the size of its economy and 
size of its population. Sudden political and economic developments have contributed 
to this deterioration of Indonesia’s leadership role, both triggered by the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997-98. What started in Thailand as a currency crisis, and stayed 
that way in most of ASEAN, triggered a series of economic and political events in 
Indonesia that culminated with the downfall of General Suharto in 1998. In Malaysia, 
the currency crisis hit hard as well, but unlike in its archipelagic neighbour, the crisis 
did not cause any major political disruptions.  
 
Political implications of the Crisis in Malaysia and Indonesia 
While the crisis remained economic in most of the other Southeast Asian 
countries, which quickly picked up the pace and resumed growth, the crisis escalated 
into a political crisis Indonesia. Due to both soaring prices on food and fuel, and to the 
acceptance of an IMF “rescue package”, riots erupted in Jakarta. In May 1998, 
Suharto, Indonesia’s President over the last 32 years, was forced to step down. The 
political chaos that followed the retirement of Suharto and the interim leadership of 
B.J. Habibie, threw the country even further into misery. Democracy was a whole new 
experience for both the people and the leaders. Additionally, the TNI (the Indonesian 
Armed Forces) wanted its say, unemployment and poverty rose, and corruption was 
running rampant. With temporarily weak government control, peripheral provinces 
such as Aceh, West Papua and East Timor started to test their new environment. In 
Aceh and West Papua, old armed conflicts blossomed once again. Chaos and civil war 
ravaged East Timor, which after a long struggle finally could celebrate independence 
in May 2002. With increasing internal unrest and unstable political climate, Jakarta 
could not prioritize backing up its political voice in ASEAN to maintain its low-key 
leadership role. 
33 
Chapter 3: Presenting the region  Jens Ottar Stærkebye 
Contrary to Indonesia during the crisis, Malaysia never accepted any IMF rescue 
packages. In retrospect, that was probably a very wise move, considering what the 
demands for tighter fiscal policy did for the Indonesian economy. Instead, the 
Malaysian government stood free to undertake what they decided was the most 
effective measures to turn their economy back around. With effective damage control 
measures in place, riots like the ones ravaging Jakarta and ultimately leading to 
Suharto’s resignation never erupted in Malaysia. The political regime stood its ground 
and stability could quickly be re-established. Thus, while the currency crisis triggered 
a political earthquake in Jakarta and the rest of Indonesia, the regime of Dr. Mahathir 
Mohammad was never threatened. Also, contrary to what happened in Indonesia, 
Kuala Lumpur never had to deal with provincial rebellions like Jakarta had to in East 
Timor, and still has to deal with, in Aceh and West Papua. In that way, the new Prime 
Minister Anwar of Malaysia is able to channel resources to work within and towards 
ASEAN in a way Indonesia temporarily has had to relinquish. 
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Chapter 4: AFTA: An empirical overview 
4.1: The creation of AFTA and the implementation of the CEPT 
scheme 
In 1977, ASEAN agreed on the establishment of a Preferential Trade Area. It 
never became an immediate success, as most of the 20.000 commodities being 
included under the PTA, were traded lightly between the ASEAN-countries. The 
Philippines, for instance, happily slashed tariffs on the import and export of 
snowploughs within the PTA. Indeed, between 1973 and 1985, total intra-ASEAN 
trade only increased by 4 percentage points (Anwar 1994: 73). Despite its 
shortcomings, however, the PTA became the foundations upon which one of the most 
significant developments of the later years was built. 
The creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area, or AFTA, was formally declared in 
January 1993 by the 6 members of ASEAN. The original intention was to have 98 
percent of intra-ASEAN trade tariff-free by 2008, which was subsequently pushed 
forward to 2005 and then finally to 2002. The mechanism for implementing this tariff-
free ASEAN Market was the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
(CEPT) Scheme. Later, it was agreed that tariff-free in fact meant that the tariff lines 
for all of the commodities, or items, in the Inclusion List would have been lowered to 
somewhere in the range of 0-5 percent (ASEAN 1998: 2). It is important to note, 
though, that only the original 6 signatories to the CEPT Scheme were required to meet 
the goal by 2002 – the four new members were allowed more time to adapt to the 
demands of the CEPT due to their lower levels of development. That meant that 
Vietnam, as the most developed of the new four members of ASEAN, is required to 
fulfil its obligations to AFTA by 2006, Burma and Laos by 2008 and Cambodia by 
2010.  
 
4.1.1: CEPT 
The CEPT Package also provides, besides the Inclusion List, a list over 
temporarily excluded, sensitive, and generally excepted tariff lines (items). The 
Inclusion List, as stated above, contains the complete number of items set for tariff 
reduction if above 5%, scheduled to be completed by 2002, and complete tariff 
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elimination by 2010 (ASEAN-6 only). Although this list contains a large majority of 
all intra-ASEAN tradable commodities (all agricultural and manufactured products), 
exceptions do occur. The provision for such exceptions is included in the Agreement 
on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(1992), article 9: 
“Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent any Member State from taking action and 
adopting measures, which it considers necessary for the protection of its national 
security, the protection of public morals, the protection of human, animal or plant life 
and health, and the protection of articles of artistic, historic and archaeological value.” 
 
On the General Exceptions List (GEL) are items, which according to ASEAN are 
permanently excluded from the AFTA-CEPT scheme for being  a threat to the areas 
listed in article 9 quoted above. Items on the Temporary Exclusion List (TEL) are 
allowed some flexibility with regard to implementation into the Inclusion List, due to 
some countries “facing real problems on their last tranche of manufactured products in 
their Temporary Exclusion Lists” (ASEAN 2002b: 4). The last category of exceptions 
is the Sensitive/Highly Sensitive List (SL). This list includes a small number of 
agricultural items (mostly rice) deemed sensitive for national production. The items on 
this list are scheduled for transfer to the Inclusion List by 2010. In 2001, ASEAN-6 
had a total of 43.675 tariff lines on the Inclusion List, out of a total of 44.4473 
(98,3%). Furthermore, 245 items were temporarily excluded, 377 were generally 
excepted, and 150 items were deemed sensitive. 
 
4.4: Dedication to AFTA in the years 2001-2004 
In this section I attempt to measure Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s dedication to 
AFTA by examining the data provided by ASEAN. These come in the form of 
spreadsheets containing complete lists over which items are included, excluded and 
sensitive. In order to operationalize “dedication,” I have chosen simply to look at the 
rate of new items added to the inclusion list, the actual number of items in the CEPT 
compared with others. I will also go qualitatively through the items that are excluded 
or deemed sensitive. 
                                                 
3 Source: ASEAN Secretariat: http://www.aseansec.org/16349.htm
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4.4.1: Statistical evidence 
I will begin this section by reviewing the statistical evidence found in the official 
data provided by ASEAN, namely the consolidated CEPT packages 1998-2004 for 
Indonesia and Malaysia respectively. 
Table 2: Consolidated CEPT Package 1998-2004. 
 Inclusion List General Exceptions Sensitive List Temporary Exclusion Total tariff lines 
  Indonesia Malaysia Indonesia Malaysia Indonesia Malaysia Indonesia Malaysia Indonesia Malaysia 
1998 6622 8621 45 63 4 104 541 276 7212 9064
2001 7192 10039 68 53 4 83 21 218 7285 10393
2002 7206 10041 68 53 11 83 0 218 7285 10395
2003 7429 10116 92 53 11 8 0 218 7532 10395
2004 11028 11661 100 53 25 8 0 218 11153 11940
Source: ASEAN Secretariat 
 
Perhaps the most important thing these statistics can tell us is that Indonesia 
appears to increase its dedication to the AFTA agreement by gradually introducing 
more tariff lines into the Inclusion List. Malaysia does not have the same progression, 
but on the other hand, it did have close to 2800 more tariff lines included in 2001 than 
Indonesia had. It is also interesting to note that Malaysia has managed to keep 218 
items on the Temporary Exclusion list. Indonesia, on its side, has more than doubled 
the number of items on the GEL since 1998.  
In 2004, ministers from the two respective countries reported that for Malaysia 
the percentage of tariff lines in the 0-5% range fell from 99,6% to 94,2% in 2004, due 
to the expansion of tariff lines included in the CEPT. The percentage of items where 
tariff lines have been eliminated also fell, from 60,3% to 50,5%. For Indonesia, 100% 
of the items on the Inclusion List were in the 0-5% range in 2003, and the same was 
scheduled for 2004.4 Total elimination of all tariff lines is scheduled for 2010 for both 
countries. 
Although the statistical data above provides us with important information, it is 
none the less insufficient for our purposes. Thus, we have to find out which are the 
items not scheduled for tariff removal. To do that, the published Consolidated CEPT 
Packages for the years 2001-2004 for Indonesia and 2001-2003 for Malaysia come in 
handy. These can be found on ASEAN’s homepages, and prove invaluably for our 
                                                 
4 Source: APEC Individual Action Plans: http://www.apec-iap.org
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purposes thus far. In 2001, the primary items on the General Exception List of the two 
countries were the same, namely alcoholic beverages and weapons. This fits well with 
the article 9 in the CEPT agreement. Both countries are Muslim states (if not based on 
Sharia law), and thus the import of alcoholic beverages and the components necessary 
for distillation of such beverages is strongly controlled. Further, it should come as no 
surprise that the Malaysian and Indonesian governments respectively would want to 
keep weapons and firearms on the General Exceptions List, in order to protect the 
national security as stated in article 9. The list of weapons and firearms on the GEL 
ranges from knives and hand weapons, via small pistols and revolvers to military class 
assault weapons. The following year, the items on the GEL were the same in the case 
of Indonesia, while it was reduced by ten items in the case of Malaysia, as can be seen 
in table (2). Also, on the Indonesian GEL, certain narcotic substances were included, 
most notably opium alkaloids and cocaine, and their respective derivatives. 
In 2003, Indonesia added 34 items to their General Exceptions List. Some of 
these represented an expansion of general categories already included, such as 
weapons and firearms, while some items were new. These were (and still are) all 
related to waste management. Examples of such items are municipal wastes and 
sewage sludge. The eight new items added in 2004 were also additions to the major 
groups already included (alcohol, weapons and residual products – waste). During the 
same years, Malaysia kept the number of items in the GEL constant. 
Malaysia has been allowed 218 items on their Temporary Exclusion List until 
now. All of these are related to the automotive sector, mostly in the form of 
completely knocked down vehicles (CKD), but also in the form of completely built up 
vehicles (CBU). The reason for this trade controlling measure becomes obvious if one 
does just a little research on the Malaysian automotive industry. One will then find out 
that 90% of the vehicles sold in Malaysia is produced wholly or partly by the two 
national car manufacturers; PROTON and PERODUA (UNESCAP 2002: 71). 
According to ASEAN, Malaysia agreed to the transfer of all these 218 items into the 
Inclusion List by January 1st 2005, reducing their intra-ASEAN tariffs to a temporary 
20 percent. 
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Finally, there are a small number of tariff lines on the sensitive/highly sensitive 
list, which all eventually will be transferred to the inclusion list. In 2004, however, 
Indonesia had 25 items deemed sensitive, while Malaysia had 8. These 8 were all 
different kinds of rice, which, least partly, is a result of the policy of self-reliance in 
the way of certain agricultural foodstuffs. To protect the national rice production is 
thus seen as vital for the nation’s self-containment when it comes to the supply of rice. 
The same reasoning is valid for Indonesia, whose 25 products in the SL all are either 
rice-related (19 items) or sugar-related (6 items). 
The eight Malaysian items on the sensitive list as of 2004 represents a major 
reduction since 2002, when there were 83 items on this list. Of these 83 products, 
many were different fruits such as pineapples, bananas and melons, along with some 
tobacco-related products, some few live animals, as well as the sugar-products and 
types of rice still in the Sensitive List. While Malaysia has reduced its number of 
sensitive products, Indonesia has increased its number somewhat. All four items in 
2002 were different rice types, while sugar was added in 2002. 
 
4.4.3: Non-tariff trade barriers 
The United Nations Conference on Trade And Development (UNCTAD) has 
identified 7 other categories of trade control measures besides regular tariffs, that may 
be or have been adopted by states in order to protect national enterprises from outside 
competition. ASEAN has adopted these categories for the sake of working towards the 
elimination of non-tariff measures (NTMs). Of these NTMs, customs surcharges, 
defined by UNCTAD as “an ad hoc trade policy instrument to raise fiscal revenue or 
to protect domestic industry,” affects the single largest number of tariff lines. NTMs 
classified as technical measures, often requiring products to fulfil certain technical 
specifications are second most important in our case. Import quotas represent another 
category that may seriously hamper free trade between the members of such a trade 
arrangement.  
As of today, Indonesia has NTMs in place for 435 products. Approximately half 
of those are different kinds of prepared and unprepared foodstuffs, salts and spices, 
and other agricultural products. Included are also most kinds of alcohol, as well as 
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some 40 odd tariff lines within the textile industry. The reasoning for having such 
NTMs in place for a majority of the items is given either as to “protect consumer 
health” or to “assure consumer’s safety.” Malaysia has far fewer identified NTMs, but 
still has between 110 and 120 in place. Close to one third of these are within the 
agricultural or food sector, including ten separate tariff lines for unroasted coffee 
alone. Also included are 19 articles related to the automotive sector, regulated by non-
automatic licensing and described to work by ways of a discretionary import license.  
It cannot be said that these findings are particularly surprising. The textile 
industry is among Indonesia’s largest industries, and employs a large number of 
people. The country’s abundant availability of cheap labour power has made it one of 
the world’s largest producers of textiles. That agricultural commodities, both refined 
and non-refined are well represented should not surprise anyone. Despite a rapid rise 
in the GDP share of the industrial and service sector (together almost 75% of the total 
GDP), 45,5% of the labour stock are still earning their wages in the agricultural 
sector5. To keep people happy in an otherwise difficult economic transition time by 
keeping certain agricultural NTMs in place must have appeared as a wise policy to the 
people in power in Jakarta. Equally, as mentioned earlier, the national car projects in 
Malaysia, the PROTON and the PERODUA, jointly account for 90% of the vehicles 
sold annually. While AFTA already has been declared realized with regard to tariff 
reductions, the progress towards the elimination of NTBs has been slow. Thus, the 
AFTA Council Ministerial Meeting urged its member countries “to accord priority 
attention to the removal of non-tariff barriers.” 
 
4.4.4: Other indicators 
Trade 
It is often useful to look at the size of the intra-regional trade flows to measure 
the strength and efficiency of a regional trade arrangement (RTA). After all, as stated 
by Gaulier et al., “since distance is an obstacle to trade, it does not come as a surprise 
that countries use to trade more intensively with their neighbours” (2004: 14).  
 
                                                 
5 Source: CIA World Factbook Online: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ (1999 estimate) 
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Table 3: Intra-bloc trade as share of total trade (exports/imports).  Million U.S. dollars and percentages. 
 Total exports  Total imports 
Intra-bloc exports as 
share of total exports 
Intra-bloc imports as 
share of total imports 
1996     
ASEAN 6 323 361 350 606 25,0 % 18,3 %
Indonesia 53 845 46 619 15,4 % 11,9 %
Malaysia 74 247 75 303 30,6 % 19,5 %
2000     
ASEAN 6 407 579 342 233 22,7 % 20,9 %
Indonesia 62 124 33 515 17,5 % 20,2 %
Malaysia 98 155 79 648 24,9 % 20,0 %
2003     
ASEAN 6 423 812 354 570 22,8 % 20,4 %
Indonesia 61 058 32 551 17,6 % 24,7 %
Malaysia 99 378 80 091 26,8 % 17,9 %
Source: ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2004 
 
As we can se from table 3, the institutional development rate of AFTA has gone 
up through tariff reduction and generally preferential treatment. Intra-bloc trade, on the 
other hand, has stayed in the lower ranges. As can be read out of the table, intra-bloc 
exports only contributed with a 25% share of the total exports from the ASEAN 6. 
This share even decreased somewhat over the following years. This decrease can 
partly, but not solely, be contributed to the Asian Financial Crisis. Intra-bloc imports 
make up an even smaller share of the group’s total imports, although it has increased 
slightly from 18,3% in 1996 to 20,4% in 2003. A look at the numbers for Indonesia 
and Malaysia respectively reveals that Indonesia’s intra-bloc exports make up an even 
smaller share of its total exports; 15,4% in 1996 and 17,6% in 2003 imply that the 
region’s largest economy is less oriented towards its neighbours than are the ASEAN 6 
group as a whole. Malaysia, on its side, exports a somewhat larger share of its 
merchandise to the ASEAN 6 market, with 30,6% in 1996 and 26,8% in 2003. Also, 
for Malaysia, being an excellent exponent for the export-led growth strategy, exports 
are an extremely important income source. Total exports equalled more than 73% of 
its GDP in 1996, surpassed total GDP in 2000 and 2001, and equalled 96,3% in 2003 
(ASEAN 2004b). Import-wise, Indonesia today imports a larger share of its total from 
its fellow ASEAN 6 members (24,7% in 2003), which is a significant increase from 
the 11,9% share in 1996. The development in Malaysian imports are somewhat less 
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encouraging from a pro-ASEAN point of view, with intra-bloc imports contributing 
with a 19,5% share of total imports in 1996 and 17,9% in 2003. 
Finally, if we compare ASEAN’s share of intra-bloc trade to other significant free 
trade areas, we find that the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) had a share of 
more than 40% in 20036, while the Euro zone in the European Union had a share close 
to 62%. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment 
The second indicator on economic and financial regionalisation is the share of 
intra-bloc FDI flows to the total FDI flows. UNCTAD defines FDI as  
“…an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and 
control by a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) 
in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor 
(FDI enterprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate)” (UNCTAD 2004a: 345).  
 
Much the same as with trade flows, a high share of intra-bloc FDI flows indicate 
a high degree of regional orientation. Generally, increasing FDI flows into a country or 
region indicates a more attractive investment climate. One of the main ideas behind an 
RTA or Regional Investment Arrangement (such as the ASEAN Investment Area, 
AIA), is to make the markets included in the agreement more attractive and 
competitive than other extra-bloc markets. Furthermore, in most developing countries, 
FDI inflows are among the most important income sources. The 10 countries of the 
ASEAN region, along with the countries of Northeast Asia (excluding Japan) are 
among the world’s largest recipients of FDI, which constitutes a large share of their 
GDP.  
 
Table 4: Share of total FDI inflows to ASEAN by selected countries of origin. Million U.S. dollars at 
current prices, and percentages. Negative signs mean disinvestment. 
 1996 2000 2002 2003
WORLD  29 915 23 405 13 468 19 346
ASEAN     
Outflow into ASEAN 4 272 1 195 3 557 2 069
Share of total inflow to ASEAN 14,3 % 5,1 % 26,4 % 10,7 %
Indonesia     
                                                 
6 WTO: International Trade Statistics 2004 – Trade by region: 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2004_e/its04_toc_e.htm  
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Outflow into ASEAN 193 -233 1 337 384
Share of total inflow to ASEAN 0,6 % -1,0 % 9,9 % 2,0 %
Malaysia     
Outflow into ASEAN 1 476 258 0 251
Share of total inflow to ASEAN 4,9 % 1,1 % 0,0 % 1,3 %
Source: UNCTAD – World Investment Report 2004 and ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2004 
 
Table 4 above shows the total inflow of FDI into ASEAN, along with the value 
and share of intra-ASEAN FDI inflows and the inflows of FDI into ASEAN 
originating from Indonesia and Malaysia respectively. As we can see, the total FDI 
inflow into ASEAN from the rest of the world has decreased rather drastically between 
1996 and 2003. Much of the decline in the FDI inflows can be contributed to the Asian 
Financial Crisis, and the deterioration in the investment climate in the region in the 
aftermath of the crisis. Fluctuations in the shares of intra- and extra-ASEAN FDI are 
heavy, however, but such fluctuations are not uncommon as FDI flows are by nature 
volatile. Today, Europe is the largest investor by FDI inflow terms in ASEAN, 
followed by the United States and Japan (ASEAN 2004b: 146). 
If we look at ASEAN’s share of FDI inflows into Indonesia and Malaysia, we see 
that ASEAN has played a lesser role in the investment climate in Indonesia than in 
Malaysia during the last 10 years. In 1995, ASEAN contributed 14% of the total FDI 
flows into Indonesia, compared to 30,2% of the flows into Malaysia. The crisis years 
caused some very real damage to the investment climate in Indonesia (and to a lesser 
degree in Malaysia), and in the post-Crisis years, investment turned to disinvestment. 
In 2000, 5,1% of the total disinvestment in Indonesia originated from the Association. 
2002 appears to have been a very special year, as the world seemingly had no faith 
whatsoever in Indonesia, while the other ASEAN countries invested rather heavily in 
the post-Suharto economy. While net FDI inflow that year was no more than 144 
million U.S. dollars, the amount of FDI originating from ASEAN even outsized the 
amount of disinvestment from the rest of the world. This trend continued, if somewhat 
subdued, in 2003, while ASEAN disinvestment continued in Malaysia. 
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Table 5: ASEAN Foreign Direct Investment in Indonesia and Malaysia. Million U.S. dollars and 
percentage. 
 Indonesia Malaysia 
Year ASEAN FDI Percentage of total FDI ASEAN FDI Percentage of total FDI
1995 608,9 14,0 % 908,4 30,2 %
2000 -232,6 5,1 % -111,6 -14,2 %
2002 1 336,6 923,7 % -759,6 362,9 %
2003 384,0 -64,5 % -45,3 1,5 %
Source: ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2004. 
 
FDI stock 
While FDI flows tell us something about the amount of FDI flowing into and out 
of a country or region for any given year, FDI stock tells us something about the 
accumulation of foreign direct investment over time. UNCTAD defines FDI stock as 
“the value of the share of the capital and reserves, including retained profits, 
attributable in an affiliate enterprise to the parent enterprise, plus the net indebtedness 
of the affiliate to the parent enterprise” (UNCTAD 2004b: 34). As opposed to FDI 
flows, however, FDI stock is much harder to estimate, especially in the developing 
world. Table 6 shows the size of the FDI inward and outward stock of Indonesia and 
Malaysia respectively, as well as FDI stock as share of the total GDP. It also tells us 
something about the two countries’ reliance upon FDI as a source of income. 
 
Table 6: FDI stocks in Indonesia and Malaysia. Million U.S. dollars and percentages. 
 FDI inward stock 
FDI inward stock as 
share of GDP FDI outward stock 
FDI outward stock 
as share of GDP 
1995     
Indonesia 50 601 25,0 % 1 295 0,6 %
Malaysia 28 731 32,3 % 11 042 12,4 %
2000     
Indonesia 60 638 40,4 % 2 339 1,6 %
Malaysia 52 747 58,5 % 21 276 23,6 %
2003     
Indonesia 57 209 27,5 % 2 710 1,3 %
Malaysia 58 979 57,2 % 29 686 28,8 %
Sources: UNCTAD World Investment Report 
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Chapter 5: The Myanmar Crisis 
Since ASEAN admitted Myanmar into its ranks in 1997, the situation in the 
country has become more and more of a liability to the Association. ASEAN’s policy 
towards the ruling military junta has been through the approach of constructive 
engagement. In this chapter, I will focus on the security aspects of the situation in 
Myanmar. In the first section I will review the “new” security concept, or the notion 
of expanded or broadened security. As I have stated above, there are several 
dimensions of the situation in Myanmar that defies the traditional (military) concept of 
security. After the end of the Cold War, though, the field of international relations and 
strategic studies has seen the necessity of broadening its horizon to also include new 
types of security. I try to place ASEAN’s challenges in Myanmar within such an 
expanded, or broadened, framework.  
 
5.1: The “New” Security Concept 
The concept of security has changed dramatically after the end of the Cold War. 
State security is more often than not threatened from within and not from external 
sources. With the lack of real external threats to national security, focus has been 
directed at other threats, through the so-called securitisation of non-security issues. 
Such securitisation of non-security issues usually comes when issues are upgraded 
from the area of “low politics” to the area of “high politics”. Furthermore, such a 
deepening of the security concept might also mean that the sovereign state no longer is 
seen as the sole referent object, “that is, units receiving threats – adding individuals, 
ecological systems, community, etc. to the traditional state-centric agenda” (Huysmans 
1998). Alas, the concept of new security might mean both that certain issues formerly 
regarded as outside the framework of state security now has become part of the states 
strategy for survival, as well a widening of the concept itself, including other units 
than the state in the study of security. 
There are mainly four groups of new security issues that constitute the mentioned 
widening of the security concept, at least in the way that I will use it in this chapter, 
namely political security, economic security, societal security and environmental 
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security (Møller 2000). These four categories are at least partly based on work done by 
Richard Ullman, who in 1983 wrote that  
“over the past decade or so a vast array of public interest organizations have begun to 
put forward alternate conceptions of national security (…) limiting population growth, 
enhancing environmental quality, eradicating world hunger, protecting human rights and 
the like” (Ullman 1983: 152).  
 
Thus, also the shift in international security policy from hard security, that is 
state security by military means, to what may be called soft security, i.e. human 
security and human rights, deserves some attention. This deepening of the security 
concept has specific relevance in the case of Myanmar, as we shall soon see. Suffice it 
to say at this point, that the relationship between state security and human security is 
inherently opposing, and that the ASEAN way of non-interference may be 
incompatible with the United Nations’ emphasis on human security. 
 
5.2: The Myanmar situation 
5.2.1: Military dictatorship 
The military junta currently ruling Myanmar has been in power for almost 17 
years, after seizing power in September 1988 following the revolution overthrowing 
General Ne Win. The junta known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC), and later the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) entered the 
corridors of power. Mass arrests on thousands of demonstrators followed. Influential 
figures, amongst them Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of the independence hero Aung 
San, were detained by the new regime (Buzzi 2001: 12-14). Following the military 
takeover, the junta changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar. 
In order to achieve legitimacy to their actions, the junta declared new 
parliamentary elections to be held in 1990. When Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the 
National League for Democracy (NLD) won the elections by a landslide victory, 
SLORC declared the results illegal and suspended the constitutions indefinitely (Clark 
1999: 773). Although there has been several figurehead Prime Ministers since 1988, 
the true power is general Than Shwe, who assumed chairmanship over SLORC in 
1992. Than Shwe disbanded SLORC in 1997, only to rename it the State Peace and 
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Development Council (SPDC) and resume leadership over the country. The change 
was merely cosmetic, and General Than Shwe remains in power of the country. 
During the years of SPDC rule, members of NLD has continually been harassed, 
assaulted and arrested. Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi has remained in varying 
levels of custody and house-arrest since 1989. Following talks between the SPDC and 
NLD, all travel restrictions – even outside Yangon – on Suu Kyi was lifted in 2002. 
On May 30, 2003, however, the SPDC again caused international outrage as Nobel 
Laureate Suu Kyi and a convoy of her supporters were attacked by “government-
affiliated thugs.”7 Consequently, Suu Kyi was detained and once again placed in 
house-arrest, while the SPDC continued trying to break down its main political 
opponent. 
 
5.2.2: Myanmar and the external environment 
Of its three non-ASEAN neighbours, Myanmar has the closest ties to China. 
Trade increased dramatically between the two countries through the 1990s, and 
political and military relations were strengthened (Buzzi 2001: 50). Arms purchases 
from China helped the Burmese armed forces modernize during the 90s, which also 
increases the junta’s control over the population. These purchases have often been 
extremely favourable for Myanmar, in exchange for political and strategic influence 
for China (Selth 2001: 17). India’s relationship with Myanmar has improved since the 
late 90s, which might be interpreted as a counterstrategy against Chinese domination. 
Several issues still remain; especially along the border where Indian and Burmese 
based rebel-groups have been known to cooperate (Buzzi 2001: 51). Strategically, 
Myanmar lies in the middle of overlapping fields of interest between China and India, 
related to the increased need for new energy sources such as oil and liquefied natural 
gas. As Asia Times states; “as both countries reach out to ensure their oil and gas 
supplies for the future, they will compete and they will cooperate. Myanmar is one 
country in the region where this convergence of interests may be demonstrated.8” 
                                                 
7 Source: U.S. Department of State – Human Rights Report 2004: 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41637.htm  
8 Source: Asia Times April 12, 2005 [Online]: “The energy ties that bind India, China” by Ramtanu Maitra 
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The European Union and the United States have adopted very similar strategies 
towards Myanmar. Economic sanctions have been introduced, such as the suspension 
of all “non-humanitarian aid or development programmes” (EU 2004). The EU does 
not ban trade with Myanmar, while the US does through “an arms embargo, bans on 
new investment and imports, an asset freeze, and a prohibition on the exportation of 
financial services to Burma and the provision of financial assistance to the GOB9.” 
Furthermore, visa restrictions have been put in place, so that high ranking officials 
(military or governmental) cannot visit any European Union member state as long as 
the sanctions are in place (ibid.). While this restriction might not seem too big a deal, 
its importance becomes clear when one takes into consideration the bi-annual Asia-
Europe Meetings (ASEM), which is alternately hosted by Asia and Europe. The 
United States has a similar policy in place. All these sanctions have been introduced in 
order to assure the release of all political prisoners, such as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, U 
Tin Oo and Hkun Htun Oo, the re-opening of NLD offices, and a genuine effort 
towards the development of a constitutional democracy in Myanmar.  
Finally, Japan has adopted something of a middle position between ASEAN and 
the EU/US line towards Myanmar. Camilla Buzzi writes that Japan’s policy “may be 
interpreted as an effort to balance the Western position and as the result of Japan’s 
preference for solutions that link aid and political reform” (Buzzi 2001: 52).  
 
5.3: ASEAN Policy towards Myanmar after 1988 
While the Western world reacted to the military takeover in Burma in 1988 with 
sanctions and condemnation, ASEAN regarded the incumbency coup in light of its 
non-interference policy. Thus, ASEAN viewed the Western condemnation of the 
SLORC’s disregard of human rights as external meddling in a country's internal affairs 
– the same reason why the Association had remained silent on the matter of Pol Pot in 
Cambodia in the 70s. Instead of sanctions and condemnation, the Association 
responded with the concept of ‘constructive engagement’. 
 
                                                 
9 Source: The U.S. Department of State online: http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rpt/43970.htm
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5.3.1: Constructive Engagement 
In the ASEAN context, constructive engagement can be backdated to 1991, and 
credited to Thai foreign minister Arsa Sarasin (International IDEA 2001: xv). Burmese 
lawyer Minn Naing Oo proposes to define the policy of Constructive Engagement as a 
“…policy which advocates the maintenance of an economic and diplomatic relationship 
with an authoritarian state as opposed to imposing sanctions and embargos on it. It has 
been described as “promoting economic and political ties, while at the same time 
pressing for democracy, open markets and human rights”” (Oo 2000: 43). 
 
An Indonesian official stated in 1992 that  
“[we] are telling them [the Myanmar regime] very quietly, in a Southeast Asian way, 
without any fanfare, without any public statements: ‘Look, you are in trouble, let us help 
you. But you have to change, you cannot continue like this’” (Acharya 2001: 109-110). 
 
Economic development is in turn supposed to lead to political and legal reform, 
while sanctions only creates a “siege mentality” in the political leadership, which 
cultivates the hardliners instead of the moderates that might be more willing to 
introduce political reforms (ibid: 52).  
There were several reasons for ASEAN to adopt the constructive engagement 
approach towards Myanmar. Firstly, there was the policy of non-interference, which 
clearly did not allow for the condemnation of human rights violations and other issues 
regarded as Myanmar’s internal affairs. Sanctions, along the European and American 
lines, were considered a violation of this principle. Secondly, the rejection of sanctions 
and the adoption of constructive engagement might be interpreted as a protest against 
Western meddling in Asian affairs. Western interference in Myanmar was 
incompatible with both non-interference and the regional autonomy of Southeast Asia 
(Acharya 2001: 110). Thirdly, there were both economic and strategic elements for 
ASEAN to consider. To stay relatively close and friendly with Myanmar became 
important in order to reduce the SPDC’s dependence on China as both economic and 
military benefactor. Furthermore, the Association hoped that Myanmar would develop 
into a market capable of consuming increasing ASEAN exports, and provide easy 
access to vast natural resources. Finally one must not forget that several of the ASEAN 
members had rather suspicious records of human rights and democracy themselves, 
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and it would not look to good for leaders like Suharto to demand democratic and legal 
reform from  the SPDC (then the SLORC), when his own record was just as bad. 
 
5.4.2: The road to Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN 
The admission of Vietnam into ASEAN was important for Myanmar on several 
accounts. Firstly, the rapprochement and eventual reconciliation of former enemies 
became an important signal to the other three non-ASEAN members in the region. 
That Vietnam was willing change to its way of thinking, so that it more closely 
converged with the other ASEAN-members was a significant signal to the Association, 
and clearly strengthened Indonesia’s case for regional autonomy. It also certainly 
smoothed the road towards membership for the other three. By ASEAN, and especially 
Indonesia, this meant that the goal of ASEAN-10 and regional autonomy moved one 
step closer (Acharya 2001: 107). Secondly, that the socialist republic of Vietnam was 
allowed to join the capitalist club of ASEAN clearly set precedent for the other three 
non-ASEAN members. It proved that as long as they adhered to the common 
principles of ASEAN, i.e. non-interference, the ASEAN way, and the accommodation 
of a market-liberal economy, they would be allowed membership. For Myanmar, this 
was especially important, in a period where the Western World became increasingly 
more occupied with issues regarding human rights and democracy. 
 
5.4.3: Indonesian and Malaysian policies towards Myanmar 
Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN was by no means automatic, despite the 
relative easiness with which Laos and Vietnam were integrated. Between 1992 and 
1997, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was struck by discord in the 
question of Myanmar’s possible membership. For Indonesia, it once again became a 
question of strengthening regional resilience, and it was argued that the accession of 
Myanmar into the ranks of ASEAN would strengthen regional autonomy and lend 
credibility to the approach of constructive engagement (Acharya 2001: 112). Malaysia, 
on the other hand had reservation, but was about to turn around over the question of 
Myanmar attending ASEAN meetings. 
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It is at this point important to remember the visions for ASEAN proposed by 
Malaysia and Indonesia. As mentioned in chapter 3, Indonesia aspired to become one 
of the world’s leading middle powers. To achieve this, it firmly believed in national 
resilience founded upon regional autonomy. Thus, it became imperative for Indonesia 
to have ASEAN include all Southeast Asian nations, in order to stand stronger against 
external penetration. The question of Chinese influence was also an important one in 
Jakarta, as Suharto believed that the encompassing of the four CLMV-countries would 
act as a buffer-zone towards Chinese influence (Buszynski 1997-98: 563). Because of 
this, Indonesia has traditionally been a strong supporter of the military regime in 
Rangoon/Yangon. Suharto also shared some of Myanmar’s experiences with 
international condemnation, due to repeated human rights abuses in East Timor and 
other provinces (ibid: 54). In that regard, Indonesia could hardly criticise the junta in 
Myanmar, and thus, the doctrine of non-interference became a blessing. 
 
5.5.4: Malaysia’s many faces 
Malaysia under Prime Minister Mahathir, was always one of ASEAN’s more 
outspoken voices with regard to regional community building. Mahathir had 
repeatedly tried to merge ASEAN with the Northeast Asian countries, to create a Pan-
East Asian Community, to further withstand the influence of the West. The inclusion 
of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia was an important step towards bringing at least the 
Southeast Asian states together. Although Myanmar was admitted into ASEAN under 
Mahathir’s chairmanship in 1997, Malaysian policy towards Myanmar has changed 
several times. At the Foreign Ministers Meeting in Manila in 1992, when Indonesia 
and the Philippines backed Myanmar’s attending ASEAN as a guest, Malaysia 
opposed the extending of such an invitation because “the ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
Meeting was not an appropriate venue for engaging the Myanmar junta in a dialogue” 
(Acharya 2001: 112). Although the unsuitability of the Foreign Ministers Meeting as a 
forum for discussing Myanmar’s role in ASEAN was the official reason for refusing 
Burmese attendance, it was assumed that the Malaysian position unofficially was a 
demonstration against SPDC’s persecution of a minority group of Rohingya Muslims. 
Under SPDC’s brutal rule in 1991-92, between 150 and 250 thousand Rohingyas fled 
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to Bangladesh. Malaysia, as a Muslim country, silently opposed Myanmar’s 
attendance at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Manila 1992 due to this 
maltreatment of fellow Muslims (Acharya 2001: 111-112). When Malaysia later 
turned around in its view on Burmese participation as a guest during ASEAN 
meetings, it was because of a bilateral agreement between Myanmar and Bangladesh, 
to repatriate the same Rohingya Muslims in 1992-93. Whether or not this deal was 
partly motivated by appeasing Malaysia (and to a lesser degree Indonesia), is not 
certain, but it greatly improved relations between mainly Buddhist Myanmar and 
Muslim Malaysia, and enticed Mahathir to take a new stand on Myanmar’s 
membership (Zaw 2001: 43). 
Indeed, Prime Minister Mahathir stated in 1996, after a meeting with General 
Than Shwe, that Myanmar’s accession into ASEAN “would accelerate economic and 
political change and that “constructive engagement” had improved conditions there” 
(Buszynski 1997-98: 565). Thus, coincidentally or not, it was during Malaysia and 
Mahathir’s chairmanship of ASEAN in 1996-1997 that Myanmar was acceded to full 
membership with the Association. Although Malaysia enjoyed far stronger 
international credibility in terms of regime legitimacy, it was hardly in any position to 
criticise the Burmese regime. One party has dominated Malaysian politics since its 
independence, and Mahathir had used his power to consolidate his position as the 
country’s most powerful man. Political repression was not uncommon, and thus, it was 
perhaps only natural that Mahathir, as had Suharto, supported Myanmar’s admission in 
the ASEAN. Today, seven years after Myanmar’s membership, the situation might 
again be beginning to change.  
 
5.4.5: Myanmar today: The thorn in ASEAN’s flesh 
In the years that have passed between Myanmar’s membership in 1997 and until 
today, it has become increasingly clear that the approach of constructive engagement 
to a large degree has failed. Instead of instigating political reform and the release of 
political prisoners, the strategy has to a certain degree consolidated the regime and 
given it a measure of legitimacy. This is claimed by, among others, Minn Naing Oo, 
who writes that “the regime, as shown by its attitude towards the ILO sanctions, may 
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have grown even bolder in its repression, strengthened perhaps by the knowledge that 
it can always turn to its ASEAN neighbours for support and assistance” (Oo 2000: 44). 
Yet, while constructive engagement hardly can be deemed a success so far, neither can 
the hard-line approach. U.S. and European shares of Myanmar’s total trade are 
basically too small to make a difference as long as China, and to a lesser degree Japan 
and ASEAN, continue to trade with the military junta. Thus, sanctions are easy to keep 
for Europe and the US, but hardly an effective tool, given the small share of 
Myanmar’s total trade they constitute. 
Yet, there should still be hope. Recent developments within the ASEAN 
community might possibly indicate a shift in the ASEAN Way. Ironically, Prime 
Minister Mahathir of Malaysia, who had been one of the strongest advocates for 
Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN, was also the first ASEAN leader to demand 
changes in the junta’s policy. The reason for this, at least the triggering factor, was the 
refusal of his wishes to meet with Aung Sang Suu Kyi during a state visit in 2003, 
after the new detention of the opposition leader (Knudsen 2003: 10). In unusually 
harsh language, Mahathir actually threatened Myanmar with expulsion from the 
Association. In June the foreign ministers collectively criticized Myanmar in a joint 
communiqué issued at the 36th ASEAN Ministers Meeting held in Phnom Penh. In the 
communiqué the foreign ministers “urged Myanmar to resume its efforts of national 
reconciliation and dialogue among all parties concerned leading to a peaceful 
transition to democracy” and “welcomed the assurances given by Myanmar that the 
measures taken following the incident were temporary and looked forward to the early 
lifting of restrictions placed on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD members.” 
Despite the careful wording in the communiqué, this is unusually strong demands from 
the collective ASEAN community. 
Then, in February and March 2005, another wave of disappointment with and 
critique against Myanmar’s military junta flowed through ASEAN. Parliamentarians in 
Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia openly stated that they 
believed that Myanmar should not be allowed the chairmanship of ASEAN, a position 
to which Yangon is entitled due to the ASEAN legal framework10. Frustration with the 
                                                 
10 Asia Times on April 1, 2005 [Online]: “ASEAN set to meddle with Myanmar” by Marwaan Macan-Markar 
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continued lack of a timeline for the so-called Roadmap to Democracy has been one of 
the more important reasons for this sudden outburst, which very well might mark the 
beginning of the end for the principle of non-sovereignty. George Yeo, Foreign 
Minister of Singapore, and Nazri Abdul Aziz, a minister in Malaysia, have been of the 
most prominent ASEAN critics during these last few months. Malaysia has been 
especially vocal in this matter, as it will fall upon them to pass the torch on to 
Myanmar if the rules are not changed. 
 
5.5: Myanmar in the new security framework 
Despite the potential for increased ASEAN pressure on the junta, Myanmar still 
poses several serious security threats to the Association. In the introduction to this 
chapter, I outlined the five different aspects of the expanded concept of security. The 
five aspects are economic security, political security, societal security, environmental 
security and human security. In this section, I will review how Myanmar in some areas 
might pose a very real security threat to ASEAN if left unchallenged in the longer run, 
and in other areas already poses a security threat to itself and the region. However, 
before doing this, it is necessary to make a few remarks about Myanmar’s importance 
to ASEAN with regard to the traditional security concept. 
Myanmar lies, as mentioned, sandwiched between India and China. It is 
increasingly depending on China for its development and provision of security. It also 
has a strategically important position with regard to the supply of energy to its giant 
north-eastern neighbour. With its eastern ports approaching maximum capacity levels, 
China will need to find alternative routes for transporting oil and natural liquefied gas 
to supply its Western provinces. Myanmar’s long coastline towards the Andaman sea 
might offer the perfect opportunity for the establishment of a deep water port for 
receiving the energy necessary. A pipeline through Myanmar to China might be seen 
as advantageous for both parts. However, India’s cooperation is necessary for securing 
the waters through which the oil tankers have to pass in order to reach Myanmar’s 
ports. This presents some interesting problems, but these are outside the scope of this 
paper. Suffice it to say so far that China’s strategic interest in Myanmar far surpasses 
that of Japan, Europe and the United States. However, one must not underestimate the 
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incentive for US involvement that Chinese intervention offers. As the US already has a 
certain human security interest in the region, a confrontation might be possible. It is 
very unlikely that Myanmar will have the explosive potential of, say, the South China 
Sea or Taiwan, but there is a certain sense of insecurity resting on the country, even in 
the traditional sense. Still, the situation in Myanmar presents us with several other 
security challenges. Two are especially obvious; namely human security and economic 
security. 
 
5.5.1: Human security 
Human security can be defined as being “oriented towards securing the life and 
basic need of individuals within and across boundaries” (Stepputat 2004: 3-4). The 
connection to Myanmar and ASEAN is obvious. We have already mentioned the 
refugee situation in Myanmar and its neighbour states. Approximately 120.000 
Burmese refugees living in camps in Thailand close to the border, with another 30.000 
living in similar camps in Bangladesh. The majority of the refugees that have settled in 
camps in Thailand and Bangladesh belongs to different ethnic minorities who have 
been forced to flee their own provinces because of civil wars between the Tatmadaw11 
and ethnic groups. Massive numbers of refugees might pose different kinds of threats 
to the security of the neighbouring nations. Direct security threats are mainly 
connected to the spill-over effects of violent conflict and refugee warriors. Such spill-
over effects may be caused by armed refugee groups carrying with them and 
continuing a violent conflict with their country of origin (Milner 2000: 12-13). As 
mentioned earlier, rebel groups based partly in India and partly in Myanmar have 
conducted guerrilla attacks on the SPDC regime. In Thailand, the Tatmadaw 
conducted a series of cross-border raids on Karen refugee camps, starting in 1995, 
posing a serious threat to both the refugee population and the local population (Lang 
2001: 5). As an outcome, the spill-over of armed conflicts in border areas, cross-border 
raids and guerrilla activities may even drag the host state into the conflict (Dowty and 
Loescher 1996: 49). This is an extreme outcome, though, and there is currently nothing 
that suggests that this will happen in neither Thailand nor Bangladesh. 
                                                 
11 Myanmar’s armed forces 
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5.5.2: Economic security 
Then there is the concept of economic security, which may easily have 
implications for the entire ASEAN area. Economic security may mean two different 
things. The narrow definition is to understand economic security as a means to and the 
foundation of military power. The second and wider definition of economic security 
may mean two things; firstly it may be to understand economic security as “functional 
substitute for the use of military power.” Secondly, it may be understood as 
“invulnerability to economic hazards which need not be created intentionally by an 
adversarial state” (Møller 2000: 9-10). This wider definition of economic security rests 
on one important assumption: A state’s security (and sovereignty) depends on it being 
capable (economically) of protecting and preserving the existing societal structures. In 
the case of Myanmar and ASEAN, it is the wider definition that appears to be the most 
relevant one. That ASEAN thus far has defended Myanmar’s right to participation in 
the ASEM meetings has increasingly become a threat to the cooperation between the 
ASEAN and EU. ASEAN has for instance repeatedly demanded that Myanmar must 
be treated by the EU as a part of the ASEAN delegation. The standoff over the 
situation in Myanmar has put the patience of both sides to the test, almost causing the 
EU to reject negotiating a new economic treaty with its Asian counterparts (Acharya 
2001: 115). Due to the argument above, the possibility of being economically cut off 
(or at least being put to a great disadvantage) may constitute a great security threat to 
ASEAN, because the economic loss caused by such repercussions might reduce these 
countries’ ability to uphold the structures upon which human and state security and 
sovereignty is depending. 
 
5.5.3: The HIV/AIDS epidemic 
Furthermore, there are some areas which might easily be understood as security 
threats, but which do not necessarily fall under any of the categories examined above. 
Firstly, there is the mentioned HIV/AIDS epidemic ravaging large segments of the 
Burmese population. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that some 
330.000 persons in Myanmar are living with HIV or AIDS. In Thailand, 570.000 
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people are estimated to be living with HIV/AIDS. Again, it appears that the threat to 
Thailand is the most serious, as the immediate neighbour of Myanmar, and the largest 
recipient of Burmese refugees. Health related issues such as epidemics of diseases like 
HIV and AIDS can be defined into the human security concept, that is, security for the 
individual, for instance through the concept offered by the UNDP in its Human 
Development Report 1994: 
“Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from 
chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from 
sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life […] Such threats can exist at 
all levels of national income and development” (p. 23). 
 
Although the HIV/AIDS epidemic today is much more widespread and 
precarious in Africa, there is no reason to believe that it does not pose the same 
potential security threats in the ASEAN area if not dealt with properly. 
 
5.5.4: Transnational crime and regional security 
Finally, there is the concept of transnational crime such as drug smuggling and 
human trafficking. Myanmar is today one of the two or three largest producers of 
opiate-based drugs such as opium and heroin (UNODC 2004: 14). The country is also 
considered one of the world’s main producers of methamphetamine (speed), along 
with China and the Philippines (ibid: 20). According to the United States Department 
of State, Myanmar is also suffering from a huge human trafficking problem, both by 
internal trafficking of women and girls for forced prostitution, and the trafficking of 
men, women and children from Myanmar to other countries for forced prostitution and 
labour (or both). According to the United States Department of State “Trafficking in 
Persons Report”, the military junta is one of the major actors in internal trafficking, 
and looks the other way when it comes to external trafficking (US Department of State 
2004: 88). Alan Dupont, Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the 
Australian National University in Canberra, proposes four different reasons why 
transnational crime may issue a state or region with serious security challenges (1999). 
Firstly it has the capacity to “undermine and subvert the authority and legitimacy of 
the government” (ibid: 436). Secondly, developing countries are especially vulnerable 
to having an economy with a heavy degree of crime money “because individuals and 
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elites become habituated to working outside the regulatory environment and the rule of 
law.” Thirdly, transnational crime poses an international security threat, because the 
“large-scale criminal enterprise can subvert the norms and institutions that underpin 
global order and the society of states.” And lastly, revolutionary and insurgent groups 
can sometimes finance their operations by turning to transnational crime (ibid: 436). 
How is this applicable to Myanmar? Despite economic sanctions imposed on the 
regime by Europe and the United States, the military junta, which is suspected of being 
largely involved in drugs and human trafficking, the regime reaps huge revenues from 
this illegal business. As the major drug production centre in the region, Burmese drugs 
contribute to finance illegal business all over the region. In Indonesia, for instance, it is 
estimated that more than 3/4 of the military funding originates from non-public 
sources. Although not all of this is drug money, or stems from other illegal sources, it 
still participates in weakening the civil society’s control over the military. Trafficking 
of drugs and persons also contribute greatly to the spreading of HIV and AIDS 
throughout the region, which further makes transnational crime a security threat to 
both the individual states and the region as a whole. 
Another aspect of transnational crime in the Myanmar context is the issue of 
weapon smuggling. The Myanmar-China-Bangladesh triangle is know to host several 
insurgent groups of different nationalities, who could easily make good money 
smuggling weapons through poorly controlled areas into ASEAN. Thus, Myanmar 
might very well become the easiest point of entry for large parties of illegal weaponry 
that might be used both by terrorists and by insurgency groups in the other ASEAN 
states. With active insurgency groups in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia and 
the Philippines, the direct threat to the region by weapon smuggling should be 
obvious. 
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Chapter 6: Analysis 
6.1: The point of departure 
At this point, before I start on the actual analysis for this paper, it is reasonable to 
take the opportunity to revisit the point of departure examined in chapter 1 and 
theoretical positions taken in chapter 2. In Chapter 1, I presented my main research 
question:  
“How do Indonesia and Malaysia approach the regional integration project of 
which they are part, and how are their policies affected by their participation in 
ASEAN?” 
In order to answer this, I proposed four further sub-questions, which I will 
systematically examine in this chapter. These were 1: Which are the approaches to the 
regional project adopted by Indonesia and Malaysia?; 2: Is it the formal or the informal 
mechanisms of ASEAN that influence Indonesia and Malaysia the strongest?; 3: Is it 
security or economy that best define the countries’ position on ASEAN?; and 4: Is it 
possible that Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s approach to ASEAN might be moving 
towards two-level intergovernmentalism? In this chapter, I take a systematic approach 
to my two cases. I examine both cases, answering each of the four questions for both 
cases respectively. 
The existing literature on ASEAN and on regional integration in general has so 
far presented me with the tools I believe I need to make this analysis work. To 
summarize this, I believe that the greatest application power lies in Andrew 
Moravcsik’s intergovernmentalism. The great degree of state-led integration, the 
importance of celebrated intergovernmental bargains (Mattli 1999: 29-30) and the low 
degree of popular participation all support this argument, at least in theory. By 
adopting this theoretical standpoint, I have made some assumptions which I then will 
apply to my empirical evidence (Chapter 4 and 5). Before venturing on, I will just 
linger on a theoretical notion for a line or three. As stated in both Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 5, and which also shall be repeated later in this chapter, the concept of human 
security is worth taking a look at. The reason why is that human security, i.e. security 
for the individual, more or less contradicts the more traditional concepts of security, in 
which state sovereignty and military defence stand central. When human security 
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seems to be gradually introduced into the ASEAN agenda, it may mean two things. 
First, it could mean that groups just underneath the government-level are managing to 
get themselves heard in the political debate, and that this level of politics also 
participates in defining the state’s preferences, such as the theory of liberal 
intergovernmentalism argues. Second, it might also very well mean that the leaders of 
the ASEAN-6 countries have decided that they have more to gain (economically) by 
adopting a pro-human security policy such as held by Europe and USA. If the former 
is the case, it certainly brings hope to those believing in a democratic ASEAN. If the 
latter is true, then it proves that the ASEAN heads of governments are not completely 
untouchable behind their shield of non-interference. Still, if this is the case, then it 
might mean that there is no drive towards two-level intergovernmentalism, and that 
ASEAN still is completely controlled by a select few elite actors. It remains to be seen, 
and hopefully, the following analysis will throw some light upon these questions. 
 
6.1.1: Comparing the cases 
In order to compare the two very different cases of integration related to economy 
(AFTA) and security (the Myanmar crisis), it is necessary to identify some common 
points of reference. In my case, these points are defined by the four sub-questions 
listed above. The four variables are consistent with these four questions, and are also 
reviewed in Chapter 1. The first variable is “leadership”, which translates into which 
role Indonesia and Malaysia has put upon themselves in the two different processes. 
Have they been acting as leaders or stragglers, and do the two cases differ in this 
regard? The second variable is “mechanisms”, which simply reflect how the 
interaction between the respective members of ASEAN, and between country and 
ASEAN as an organisation is played out. Is it through formal or informal channels this 
interaction takes place? The third variable is “integration sector,” in which I ask which 
sector is the main driver in the integration process. Is it security or economy? It may 
seem strange to ask in each of my two cases, but in the end this is a question that 
should be answered. The last variable I’m looking for is “liberal 
intergovernmentalism.” This is in order to establish whether or not ASEAN is moving 
towards such a model of two-level decision making. In the following sections, I will 
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systematically go through the two empirical cases that I have examined earlier in this 
paper, in order to identify the four variables listed above. In the conclusion to this 
chapter, I will compare the two cases, in order to try to answer my original question. 
Furthermore, as a last point in this section, I have decided to systematize my data 
further, by dividing each case into three periods. Although this might be a little 
problematic due to the relatively short time span of the two cases, I believe that it is 
still possible to defend such an approach. In the case of AFTA, I have identified a pre-
AFTA period, which was the time between 1991, when talks of AFTA actually started, 
and 1993, when it was put into operation. Then there was the period between 1993 and 
1997, the period in which the members adjusted to the new regime. Finally, there is the 
late period, from 1998 until today. In the case of the Myanmar crisis, I have defined 
the Pre-ASEAN period, in which the ASEAN members discussed Burmese 
membership, as the period between 1991 and 1997. Then there as the period of 
adjustment between 1997 and 2003, from Myanmar’s accession to membership and 
until the new detainment of Aung Sang Suu Kyi. The shortest period in this case is 
from 2003 until today.  
 
6.2: AFTA 
6.2.1: Which approaches to the regional project are adopted by Indonesia 
and Malaysia? 
All decision-making in ASEAN takes place (formally) at the ministerial level and 
above. Regular cooperation schemes are often negotiated in the respective Ministers 
Meetings, while larger decisions are left to the Foreign Ministers Meeting, the 
Economic Ministers Meetings or the ASEAN Summit, where the respective Heads of 
Governments meet annually. The (formal) process appears rather simple. They meet, 
they talk, and they reach an agreement. This was also the case with the Agreement on 
the Establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area. AFTA was first proposed at the 
Economic Ministers Meeting in October 1991 and a framework agreement was agreed 
on and signed at the following fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in January 1992. 
AFTA was formally put into operation January 1993 (Bowles 1997: 220). According 
to Joseph L. H. Tan (1996), it was Thailand who initiated the proposal for the 
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establishment of the AFTA. Neither Malaysia nor Indonesia is mentioned in particular 
at any place in the literature as main drivers towards the establishment of the AFTA in 
this first phase, that is, the Pre-AFTA period. Instead, it may seem as if Indonesia in 
particular, as the most protected economy in ASEAN had great concerns over the 
liberalization that implementing the AFTA would lead to. This was mostly due to the 
fear that their (heavily protected) firms would not be able to compete with more 
efficient firms in the other ASEAN states (Menon 1996: 4). Malaysia, which along 
with Thailand was the most developed economy of ASEAN, after Singapore, was, 
according to Jayant Menon, supposed to play a leading role in the implementation of 
AFTA (ibid: 3). Instead, calls for stronger protection were issued, and the AFTA 
project slowed down almost from day one.  
In the latest phase of AFTA, things changed. After the Asian Financial Crisis in 
1997-1998, the ASEAN countries seemed to realize that it would be necessary to 
increase intra-regional trading and tighten regional bonds if ASEAN was to survive in 
the new millennium. The need for increasing regional interactions and creating a 
favourable investment climate in order to ease the recovery after the crisis was 
repeated time after time during the AFTA Council Ministerial Meetings. However, the 
AFTA implementation date had already been re-scheduled prior to the crisis, and to 
step up the work towards realizing the AFTA in 2003 was a very convenient policy 
instrument at the time. At the AFTA Council meeting in 1999, it was also agreed that 
the final realization date of the CEPT scheme would be set to 2002. If we look at the 
situation today, things are somewhat different from what we ought to expect from the 
countries’ respective positions on AFTA at the very beginning. As stated in chapter 4, 
Malaysia had more than 94% of their tariff lines in the 0-5% range in 2004, which was 
a decrease from 2003 due to an expansion of tariff lines included in the CEPT between 
the two years. At the same time, only 50.5% of the items included reached 0% tariffs. 
Indonesia, on the other hand, was in 2003 the first country to reach the goal of 100% 
of the items within the given tariff-range. To conclude this section, it seems that there 
has been a change in both Indonesia and Malaysia with regard to which role they play 
in the economic integration scheme. While they both seemed somewhat reluctant to 
dedicate themselves completely to AFTA in the beginning, they now seem to be taking 
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more charge of the process – at least if the tariff reduction rates are anything to judge 
by. Indonesia was the first country to reach complete 0-5% tariff coverage on the items 
included in the CEPT scheme, and it is also one of the foremost ASEAN countries 
with regard to completely eliminating tariffs. 
 
Regionalism vs. regionalization revisited 
As mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, there is a significant, if often overlooked, 
difference between regionalism and regionalization. To repeat, regionalism is an active 
political program or ideology, often based on the notion of a regional identity and 
shared values. Regionalization, on the other hand, is the actual process, intended or 
not, of increased transactions between the countries within a region. In our case it can 
be said that while ASEAN may constitute the political programme of “regionness”-
building (Hettne & Söderbaum 2002), AFTA represents the pragmatism of 
regionalization as a means to regionalism. However, most literature argue that for 
economic regionalization, for instance through an FTA, to contribute to increased 
regionalism, intra-regional economic (or financial) transactions should be increasing. 
In ASEAN, this has not yet been the case. Indeed, despite being celebrated as the most 
successful regional integration scheme in the developing world, ASEAN has been 
unable to increase the share of intra-regional trade among its members. Total intra-
bloc trade percentages remain in the low twenties, which is far below other trade blocs 
that may be comparable. The three countries of NAFTA, for instance, has been able to 
raise the share of intra-regional exports and imports to approximately 41%, while the 
European Union has by far the largest share of intra-bloc trade, with its 60%. 
The perception of Asia as the region with the lowest degree of economic 
regionalization is supported by Guillaume Gaulier, Sébastien Jean & Deniz Ünal-
Kesenci of the French CEPII institute. By examining bilateral export-import-patterns, 
they have been able to identify a tri-polar world structure, consisting of America, Asia-
Oceania and Eurafrica. Of these three “blocs”, Asia (excluding Japan, China and South 
Korea) has the weakest trade polarization. The same goes for FDI stock, where, using 
the same method, intra-ASEAN FDI stock (both inwards and outwards) is virtually 
non-existent. Furthermore, by using the so-called relative trade intensity index, they 
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conclude in their working paper “Regionalism and the Regionalisation of International 
Trade” that Asia is the Triad-region (America, Asia-Oceania and Eurafrica) that is the 
least polarized (2004: 5). The Relative Trade Intensity index is a method that is used to 
determine whether the value of trade between two countries is greater or smaller than 
would be expected on the basis of their respective importance in world trade. The 
method simply measures trade intensity as the share of one country's exports going to 
a partner divided by the share of world exports going to the partner. According to this 
index, which is purely relative and completely independent of the openness and size of 
the measured economies (ibid: 23), the degree of bilateral trading between ASEAN 
partners is relatively low, compared with bilateral EU trade relations (ibid: 26). 
Although the RTI index is a more advanced method than un-weighted aggregation of 
measuring the polarization of trade the intensity of intra-bloc trade, the trend seems the 
same. Asia and the ASEAN countries in particular, have lower shares of intra-bloc 
trade and investment than other comparable congregations of states such as Mercosur, 
NAFTA and the European Union have. This certainly indicates a low degree of 
economic regionalization, but this does not necessarily indicate a low degree of 
regionalism. 
 
6.2.2: Is it the formal or the informal mechanisms of ASEAN that 
influence Indonesia and Malaysia the strongest? 
As in any international or regional organization, much of the interaction between 
the member states takes place outside the formal organs. However, in an organization 
like ASEAN, with relatively few and weak institutions, no supra-national powers, and 
sporadic, if regular, summits, it is reasonable to suspect an even higher degree of 
informal interaction. Indeed, as stated by Amitav Acharya, the ASEAN Way 
emphasizes “informality and organisational minimalism” (2001: 5). Acharya, 
however, was referring to the possibility of ASEAN evolving into a security 
community, which we shall return to a bit later. In the economic sphere, such evidence 
is harder to come by. Still, a few factors are worth mentioning. First, given the 
relatively vague and open formulation of the Agreement on the Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area of 1992, much decisional 
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power is left to the respective countries. This, in turn, suggests that ASEAN 
multilateralism works more like a series of bilateral decisions, in an “agree first, 
negotiate later” fashion. To underline this further, it is stated on ASEAN’s official 
homepages that although the ASEAN Economic Ministers agreed to accelerate the 
realization of AFTA in 1995, the implementation of this agreement, and the actual 
acceleration of the implementation process, took place on a “voluntary or unilateral 
basis12.” Thus, there is reason to believe that the informal aspect of AFTA, as much as 
the formal, defines Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s interaction with ASEAN in this regard. 
Still, the informal and the formal channels of interaction need not be opposing ones. In 
this case it is likely that the informal mechanisms at the very least supplement the open 
and tentative agreements that have been negotiated at the Ministers Meetings and at 
ASEAN Summits. Another factor worth mentioning is the tendency to leave the 
settlement of differences, or even conflict settlement, to the member countries 
themselves. ASEAN prefers such negotiations to be held outside the formal ASEAN 
framework, as far as it is possible. Indeed, in the AFTA Protocol on Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism, it is stated that “any differences shall, as far as possible, be 
settled amicably between the Member States13”. Given the lack of evidence, it is 
difficult to say anything concluding about the influence that ASEAN has over 
Indonesia and Malaysia through its formal institutions and the interaction and 
transaction mechanisms it offers. As with many other ASEAN agreements, though, the 
protocols and agreements of AFTA are vague, and leave much to its members’ 
discretion. Thus, it seems plausible that interaction outside the formal ASEAN 
framework, between the respective members, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, is very 
important in this regard. As stated above, however, the decisional power rests on the 
respective governments, and much of the implementation of AFTA relies on unilateral 
moves. An example might be the Malaysian decision to include completely built up 
(CBU) and completely knocked down (CKD) vehicles in the CEPT package one year 
ahead of schedule. 
 
                                                 
12 Source: http://www.aseansec.org/10097.htm  
13 Source: http://www.aseansec.org/16654.htm  
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6.2.3: Is it security or economy that best defines the countries’ position 
on ASEAN? 
It might seem a banal question to ask in this context, but there are still some 
considerations to make. First and foremost, it is important to establish whether 
economic integration is a goal in itself, whether it is a tool to secure a significant share 
of the world economy or to achieve other purely economic motives, or whether it is 
aimed at securing the funds for strengthening the security of the group. In this case, 
most evidence indicates that AFTA was established with economic gains as the sole 
motivation. This was to be achieved through the “integration of ASEAN into a single 
production base, and creating a regional market of 500 million people” (ASEAN 2002: 
1). Although virtually all ASEAN countries have been modernizing their military over 
the last few years, the share of military of the total GDP has not increased significantly 
since 1997 and until today. Indonesia has increased its military expenditure by only 
0.2 percentage points, while Malaysia has increased its share by 0.5 percentage 
points14. The lack of increasing military expenditure might indicate that being a 
member of AFTA is mainly motivated by economic incentives, although this is not 
certain. Another factor contributing to this conclusion is the very distinct separation 
between economic integration and security/political integration in Southeast Asia. 
Indeed, there have been few substantial links between the economic branch and the 
security branch of ASEAN. Although the linkage between economy and security 
might become clearer at later stages of integration, it seems safe to conclude (for now) 
that AFTA is a goal in itself, and not just a means to increased (traditional) security. 
 
6.3: The Myanmar Crisis 
6.3.1: Which approaches to the regional project are adopted by Indonesia 
and Malaysia? 
As opposed to its approach towards the establishment and development of AFTA, 
Malaysia has assumed (insofar as any country has done so) the mantle of leadership in 
affairs dealing with Myanmar. The direction of this leadership, however, has had a 
                                                 
14 Source: Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 
http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_database1.html  
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tendency to change. Furthermore, it is more than likely that Malaysia’s strong views 
on Myanmar and Burmese membership in ASEAN has been a result of the personal 
idiosyncrasies of the charismatic Prime Minister Mahathir, and not necessarily has 
reflected the Malaysian state’s views. Still, whether or not this is true is not 
particularly important in this case, since Mahathir enjoyed a large amount of personal 
power over state affairs, and to a large extent shaped both domestic and foreign affairs 
to his own wishes during his long period of premiership. Indonesia’s policies towards 
Myanmar were also dominated by President Suharto, who to a certain extent could 
relate to the military regime in Myanmar, and therefore supported it. 
When we compare ASEAN’s handling of the Myanmar Crisis with the previous 
case of AFTA, the first thing that strikes us is the extreme lack of multilateralism and 
the absence of a common goal. Although the Myanmar Crisis has been mentioned at 
both ARF meetings, Ministerial Meetings and the ASEAN Summits, there have been 
no negotiations or discussions about how to solve the crisis. Instead, much of 
ASEAN’s dealings with Myanmar have been on a unilateral or bilateral basis outside 
the ASEAN framework. Such meetings have often been formal state visits, but outside 
the formal ASEAN setting. Much of this reluctance to get involved obviously has to 
do with the principle of non-interference in other states’ internal affairs. 
 
6.3.2: Is it the formal or the informal mechanisms of ASEAN that 
influence Indonesia and Malaysia the strongest? 
In this case, the informal mechanisms must necessarily be the dominant influence 
on our two countries. The reason seems simple: The few formal security arrangements 
and agreements within the ASEAN framework, such as the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation, ZOPFAN, ARF, and the Foreign Ministers Meetings, are vague and 
mostly call on the signatories to settle disputes peacefully amongst themselves and not 
interfere in each others internal affairs. Instead of providing concrete measures aimed 
at enhancing security and the resolution of disputes and conflicts, ASEAN aims to 
facilitate unilateral or bilateral resolutions through confidence and trust building. Thus, 
it seeks to promote bilateral and/or unilateral solutions among its members. 
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There is plenty of evidence that both Indonesia and Malaysia work through non-
formal channels, for instance through quiet diplomacy, both in the case of Myanmar 
and in other security related cases. During the Cambodia-crisis, for instance, 
Indonesian high level officials communicated extensively with their counterparts in 
Hanoi. Malaysia, on its side, came to a bilateral resolution over the Sabah conflict with 
the Philippines in the early years of ASEAN’s existence. Furthermore, several lesser 
scale bilateral disputes involving either Indonesia or Malaysia have been resolved, or 
at least put on hold – partly due to the importance of ASEAN in the foreign policies of 
the respective countries. In relation to Myanmar, much has been left to bilateralism 
and talks outside the formal ASEAN framework. Still, the granting of full Burmese 
membership must be considered a clear, yet ultimately futile, attempt by ASEAN to 
influence the military junta through formal channels. They believed that membership 
in the Association would mellow the junta, and make them susceptible to gentle 
prodding from the other Southeast Asian leaders. Needless to say, that has not 
happened. Furthermore, although Myanmar’s membership necessarily had to pass 
through the official channels, the agreement on Myanmar’s participation was very 
much a result of unilateral proposals from countries like Malaysia, during whose 
chairmanship Myanmar became a full member of the Association. Also Indonesia, 
who pursued its own regional agenda along with the ASEAN vision of ‘One Southeast 
Asia’, supported Burmese membership. Despite the dominance of communicating 
through channels outside the ASEAN framework, there are a select few cases in which 
the formality of ASEAN has been used to approach the military junta in Yangon. The 
most notable case, and most likely the only one worth mentioning, happened when the 
ASEAN foreign ministers in an unprecedented move went and criticised Myanmar in a 
joint communiqué following the re-detainment of Aung San Suu Kyi in 2003. That 
such critique actually was promoted through a formal ASEAN channel, such as at the 
Foreign Ministers Meeting, reveals quite well how potentially dangerous an unsolved 
Myanmar crisis might be for ASEAN’s reputation in the rest of the world. That it was 
Malaysian Premier Mahathir who took the initiative to this critique, and actually 
threatened Myanmar with expulsion (see Chapter 5) is also important, since Mahathir 
was once one of the strongest supporters of Burmese membership.  
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6.3.3: Is it security or economy that best defines the countries’ position 
on ASEAN? 
There are two words that more or less wrap up the existence of ASEAN as a 
regional organization. The first is sovereignty, the second is economy, and in the case 
of Myanmar they are both mixed together. Although I argued that the Myanmar crisis 
indeed must be considered a security hazard if one takes on the new security concept 
in Chapter 5, it is none the less a fact that economy, and economic security, plays a 
large part in ASEAN’s interest in Myanmar. I will elaborate this a bit further here. 
First and foremost, if one disregards the bold vision of “One Southeast Asia,” 
there were two mainly economic reasons for inviting Myanmar to become a member 
of the Association. The first reason was the distinct possibility of Myanmar’s huge 
population to develop into a market capable of absorbing increased manufacture 
outputs from the more advanced economies of Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Indonesia. The second reason was to gain easy and cheap access to Myanmar’s vast 
natural resources. As a by-product, or as a rationalisation for the constructive 
engagement approach, it was hoped that increased economic gains from trading with 
its neighbours would in turn cause development, increased welfare and ultimately 
increase the Burmese population’s capabilities to demand political reforms. Secondly, 
an important fact is that constructive engagement has failed, and even the ASEAN 
countries have begun admitting to it. Instead of gently nudging the junta in the right 
direction, ASEAN’s mantra of non-interference has been utilized by the junta as a 
shield towards external interference. The increased revenue from trading with the other 
ASEAN countries has largely been used to modernize the Tatmadaw – the Burmese 
armed forces – and increase the junta’s hold over the population. Thus, with the lack 
of economic development and proper re-distribution of wealth, Myanmar has not 
developed into the market ASEAN had hoped for. Additionally, although the 
unbearable situation in Myanmar has long been recognized by the Western world, it 
has not been until recently that the other ASEAN members have been forced to do so. 
Again, this recognition is primarily motivated by economic factors, as the European 
Union has threatened to withdraw, or at least refuse to re-negotiate, important trade 
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agreements between the two trading blocs, unless ASEAN manages to do something 
about the Burmese human rights situation. Under the threat of being put at an 
economic disadvantage, combined with the new democratic situation in Indonesia and 
Malaysia, voices have been raised in order to demand that Myanmar should not be 
allowed to assume chairmanship over ASEAN in 2006. Although Indonesia has 
remained relatively quiet on this front, Malaysian parliamentarians have made 
themselves heard so much the better. But again, this opposition in Malaysia to 
Burmese “leadership” might stem from economic reasons: If Myanmar is to be 
allowed to assume the mantle of the ASEAN Chair; it would be Malaysia’s duty to 
pass it on. This symbolic action potentially could be very damaging to Malaysia’s 
image in the rest of the world. 
 
6.4: Is it possible that Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s approach to 
ASEAN might be moving towards two-level intergovernmentalism? 
As stated several places elsewhere in this paper, times are changing and 
democracy is in the making in both Malaysia and Indonesia. Although Malaysia 
formally has been a democracy since gaining its independence in 1957, is has been 
under the rule of the same party since then. Although the regime is not necessarily 
undemocratic, it was known to use authoritarian methods such as extensive cronyism 
and rigged elections – especially under the long premiership of Mahathir bin 
Mohamad. During his 22 year long Premiership, he was able to gather almost 
authoritarian power for his own office. Indeed, Malaysian policy under the reign of 
Prime Minister Mahathir was more or less formed after his will. Despite being 
formally bound by the majority in the National Assembly, Mahathir controlled it since 
it was his own party that constituted this majority. Thus, the preliminary conclusion 
that intergovernmentalism fits Malaysia’s – and Mahathir’s – approach to ASEAN 
seems to hold, at least on that account. 
In Indonesia, democracy was hardly even formal. Although President Suharto 
held regular elections, these were no more than political window dressing, with a 
100% of the votes being for the President. Being commonly recognized as a personal 
authoritarian state, Indonesian domestic and foreign policy was dominated by the ideas 
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of the President and a small circle of close ministers and advisors. Also, being closely 
linked to the armed forces, Suharto could no afford to alienate the generals who had 
formerly been his colleagues. Generally, however, Indonesia’s involvement in ASEAN 
was, as with Malaysia and Mahathir, President Suharto’s project. Indeed, there were 
some relatively prominent commonalities between the two leaders. Of course, the most 
obvious was the great concentration of power their respective offices had acquired. 
The most significant commonality in this regard, however, was the two state leaders’ 
vision of “One Southeast Asia.” Mahathir’s motivation was what he called 
“modernization without Westernization,” which could only be achieved by integrating 
the ten economies and cultures of Southeast Asia, and in the longer run also the entire 
East Asia. To him, ASEAN became the solution, the first step towards a greater East 
Asian Caucus. Indeed, it seems safe to say that Malaysia’s participation in ASEAN to 
a large extent became Prime Minister Mahathir’s personal vision. President Suharto’s 
view on ASEAN was somewhat more pragmatic. As stated in Chapter 3, Shee Poon-
Kim claims that part of Suharto’s motivation for making ASEAN a major part of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy was that it would serve his own vision of Indonesia as one 
of the world’s leading middle range powers through regional resilience and autonomy. 
Today, much has changed. Both President Suharto and Prime Minister Mahathir 
have been removed from office, or quit, both in relatively civil and organized ways. 
Suharto was pressured to retire during the Asian Crisis, while Mahathir was forced by 
his own party to retire in 2003. In both countries, political affairs have become 
significantly more democratic. This is most notable in the former authoritarian state of 
Indonesia. Introducing political reforms and entering the transition towards true 
democracies, the countries’ approach to ASEAN and regional integration is bound to 
change. There are several factors to consider here. First, one must be mindful of the 
few cases even indicating there being a change towards two-level 
intergovernmentalism. The most significant signal thus far is the afore-mentioned 
protest by several prominent members of parliament – especially in Malaysia – to 
Myanmar assuming the Chairmanship of ASEAN. Nazri Abdul Aziz, Minister of 
Parliamentary Affairs in Malaysia, was quoted in the Asia Times on March 25, 2005, 
saying “Myanmar's turn to be the chairman of ASEAN [ought] to be suspended and 
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given to other countries until democratic reforms are carried out”. Indeed, Mr. Aziz 
represents a group of voices who was rarely heard during the Premiership of Mahathir. 
According to the thesis of neo-liberal intergovernmentalism, politicians such as Mr. 
Aziz will contribute strongly in the process of determining the state’s preferences and 
interests. Although it is too early to say, it is plausible that the ‘new’ democracy in 
Malaysia following the retirement of Mahathir will facilitate such a turn of events. 
 
6.4.1: Myanmar and the New Security 
If the respective states’ participation in ASEAN in the future will depend more 
upon popular approval, and if interest groups on the domestic level become more 
involved in the process of determining the state’s preferences, then there will be some 
interesting and important implications. Of these, one is especially important to this 
thesis, given the approach taken to the Myanmar Crisis. The implication in question is 
the potential for increased focusing on the human security concept, and the wider 
implications this will have for the wider, new security concept. Such increased focus 
on the human rights situation in Myanmar will also have implications of a similar 
character in the rest of the region, where many governments have relatively shady 
records. If this is to happen, though, some changes must be forthcoming, both from the 
rulers and from those being ruled. As such, there is namely a widely established 
consensus over the Association’s elite fundaments. Both in Indonesia and in Malaysia, 
ASEAN has mainly been supported by the industrial and business elites, as well as the 
military. The common Indonesian or Malaysian have been relatively unconcerned with 
an organization that is perceived to be distant and more of a playground for their 
‘leaders’, and the Association itself has been relatively unconcerned with the affairs of 
the common man. However, if ASEAN is to become two-level intergovernmentalistic, 
there must come forth some changes of attitude. If ASEAN continues to be perceived 
as a forum for the powers to use, and popular interest in the Association remains low, 
then it is likely that nothing will change. However, if a gap between the interests of the 
elites and the interests of the people actually exists in the area of security and the 
Myanmar Crisis, a change could, and should be forthcoming. 
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The logic is indisputable: If, through the parliamentary chain, the President’s or 
Prime Minister’s power truly rests upon a popular mandate, the given government will 
have to compromise in order to secure renewed support. Thus, whereas the ASEAN 
governments have been reluctant to deal with the military junta in Yangon thus far, 
and been able to refrain from taking action, they might in the future have to do 
something due to popular pressure. It is reasonable to assume that the domestic 
political parties and members of parliaments might be more concerned with notions of 
human rights and security, and less concerned with sovereignty and hard security than 
the heads of governments are. Still, there are always objections to such a view on 
things. It might, for example, be argued that the preoccupation with human security 
and the securitization of non-security issues is a typical Western notion, and that the 
people of the Southeast Asian states do not share this set of values. I can neither prove 
this argument right nor wrong within the scope of this thesis, but I find it hard to 
believe, based on my research, that the people of Indonesia – previously deprived of 
any political rights – or the people of Malaysia share the single minded focus on non-
interference and traditional security threats of their (former) leaders. 
 
6.4.2: Another possibility 
Although I am positive in my assessment of the possibility that ASEAN might 
develop into an organization based on the preferences determined by both the 
respective heads of governments as well as by other political groups on the domestic 
level, there is always the possibility that I am too optimistic, or even plainly wrong. By 
re-examining the evidence laid forth in Chapter 4 and 5, as well as in this chapter, 
there might be indications that this could be the case. First and foremost, there is the 
possibility that the new pressure which the other ASEAN countries have put upon 
Myanmar is not at all the result of level 2 politics – domestic politics and negotiations 
– but of the governments of the leading ASEAN members finally giving in to the 
pressure from the European Union and the United States. There might be several 
reasons for such a turn of events, most notably the fact that the European Union have 
threatened ASEAN with economic sanctions should they fail to engage the regime in 
Yangon and push for political reforms. As stated in Chapter 5, the European Union has 
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during the later years become ASEAN’s largest and most important trade partner, and 
should the EU fail to sign new and preferable treaties with its Asian counterpart it 
would be disastrous for ASEAN. The likelihood of this being the cases increases even 
further when one considers the impact of the Asian Crisis. The crisis reminded the 
former tiger cub economies of Southeast Asia that they were extremely vulnerable to 
fluctuations in the world market. Also, by threatening to refuse to re-negotiate existing 
trade agreements, the EU gave the Association a clear reminder of how imperative 
European trade and investment is to the recovery and continued growth of the 
respective ASEAN economies.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
Since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998, the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations has been going through a series of changes. Left with a broken back and 
loss of power in the wake of the Crisis, ASEAN has since managed to re-establish 
itself as a regional power. With AFTA being officially realized within the ASEAN-6, 
the Southeast Asian market is becoming an economic bloc to be reckoned with. 
Likewise, the ASEAN Regional Forum is becoming an increasingly important forum 
in security related matters in the Asia-Pacific – ASEAN is currently being approached 
by other actors within the extended East Asian region, and other major global actors. 
Furthermore, the situation is made much more interesting due to the imminent “clash 
of civilizations” - all the world’s major powers seemingly converge on the 
economically and strategically important Asia-Pacific region. In an age of 
regionalisation and regionalism, trade blocs and new security, ASEAN is becoming an 
important facilitator when the great powers meet, and it is within such a context that I 
have chosen to work on this thesis. The purpose of this study has been to identify 
“How do Indonesia and Malaysia approach the regional integration project of which 
they are part, and how are their policies affected by their participation in ASEAN?” 
This research question has been analysed against a theoretical backdrop of 
intergovernmentalism. Still, this paper has not been overly concerned with either the 
motive of falsifying or verifying whether intergovernmentalism (or any other 
theoretical branches) is a suitable theoretical approach. Instead, the aim of my thesis 
has been to map the approach of two countries to the regional integration project of 
which they are part, based on empirical observations. In this final chapter, I will draw 
some conclusions and sum up my general findings, hopefully tying up some loose 
ends. I also address briefly some future prospects over ASEAN integration.  
 
7.1: General findings 
Through my analysis, I have come to various conclusions with regard to my four 
questions/hypotheses, which can be summarized as in the table below. In this section, I 
will make some remarks to some of the more interesting findings. I will address these 
briefly. 
75 
Chapter 7: Conclusions  Jens Ottar Stærkebye 
Table 7: Summarized table over the empirical findings 
Question Hypothesis Findings case 1 Findings case 2 Conclusion
Which are the 
approaches to the 
regional project 
adopted by Indonesia 
and Malaysia? 
Both countries have 
been acting as leaders 
in order to enforce 
regional integration 
Not necessarily, 
although Indonesia 
has taken to the 
principle of 
“leadership by 
example.” 
Both countries have 
indeed been acting 
as leaders, although 
their position on 
Myanmar has varied 
Hypothesis  
slightly 
strengthened 
Is it formal or informal 
mechanisms of 
ASEAN that influence 
Indonesia and 
Malaysia the 
strongest? 
The perseverance of 
ASEAN is due to the 
informal framework of 
cooperation that the 
Association offers 
Mainly formal, but 
with much 
unilateralism 
Informal Hypothesis strengthened 
Is it security or 
economy that best 
defines the countries’ 
position on ASEAN? 
It is security-political 
issues that define the 
countries’ position on 
and approach to 
regional integration 
Economy Economic security Hypothesis weakened 
Is it possible that 
Indonesia and 
Malaysia’s approach 
to ASEAN might be 
moving towards two-
level 
intergovernmentalism? 
In the medium to long 
term ASEAN will 
move towards two-
level neo-
intergovernmentalism 
Unlikely in the short 
run, more likely due to 
democratization in the 
medium-to-long run 
Possibly already, 
but too early to say. 
Small signs so far, 
but this might just 
be coincidental. 
Uncertain 
 
First I asked which approach the two countries had adopted towards regional 
integration. My hypothesis in this regard was that both countries had assumed various 
kinds of leadership roles, insofar as their influence and capabilities had allowed them 
to. The empirical evidence does not support this hypothesis fully, although I believe 
that the hypothesis is strengthened. This is mainly due to the findings in the security 
case; Indonesia through silent support (until the fall of Suharto, that is), and Malaysia 
through the pragmatic antics of Premier Mahathir. When it comes to economic 
integration, neither country can be said to be declared explicit leaders, although 
Malaysia originally was intended to assume such a role. Instead, Indonesia was the 
first country to reach fulfilment of the CEPT agreement and thus assumed leadership 
by example. 
My second variable was the degree of formality in the two cases. My working 
hypothesis was that informal mechanisms to a large extent had contributed to the long 
(some would even say overdue) life of the Association. Given the limited power of the 
ASEAN institutions and the extreme reliance on uni- and bilateral decisions lends 
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credibility to this hypothesis, as examined in the previous chapters. However, the 
concrete findings, especially with regard to the Myanmar Crisis, suggest that informal 
channels and silent diplomacy is in fact facilitated by the “formal” framework that the 
Association itself provides. 
Question three asks whether economic motives or security motives are the ones 
driving regional integration. Preliminary studies suggested that security is the defining 
characteristic, and that the sensitivity of sovereignty and security may in fact be one of 
the reasons why economic integration has come thus much farther than security. I fully 
embrace the fact that ASEAN was indeed created in order to protect the security and 
sovereignty of its members. Still, I also believe that my findings suggest that economic 
concerns and economic security (in the wider sense) might be on the verge of 
overthrowing the importance of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs 
of other sovereign states. If the evidence from Myanmar is anything to judge from thus 
far, it seems as if economic relations with the European Union very well might 
override the Association’s traditional reluctance to criticize other regimes. On the 
other hand, however, there is a possibility that economic issues overriding security 
issues might just be the result of changing contexts. Whereas the Cold War-world, in 
which ASEAN was established, was extremely focused on traditional security, the 
context of an interdependent and globalised world increasingly directs focus on new 
areas of security, such as economic security. Thus, it might not necessarily be ASEAN 
that has moved its priorities, rather than having had new priorities superimposed upon 
it in the new and globalised reality. Thus, one might wonder whether change of 
context is an explanation that is both sufficient and necessary, or necessary but not 
sufficient. 
Finally, I asked whether ASEAN decision making eventually might come to 
resemble the neoliberal intergovernmentalism of Andrew Moravcsik. My hypothesis 
was, and still is, that this most likely will come to pass. Still, it is impossible to say 
much in one direction or another in this regard. There are especially three factors why 
this must be so. Firstly, there is the fact that democracy, transparency and openness is 
virtually newly born in Indonesia, while it was re-established in Malaysia very 
recently. While both Suharto and Mahathir were practically totally insulated from 
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pressure from below in their decision making, this is not the case in a mature 
democracy. Secondly, both countries have a lot of other problems to deal with, apart 
from ASEAN. It is easy to imagine the common man and woman in Indonesia and in 
Malaysia being more concerned with raising their personal economic welfare than 
with demanding popularly mandated representation in the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations. Thirdly, as mentioned in chapter 6, it is also possible that what might 
be interpreted signs of two-level intergovernmentalism is just incidental. The reason 
why the respective ASEAN governments appear to listen to these demands could be 
that they coincide with economic pressure from the European Union and the United 
States. Although left without strong evidence, I believe that ASEAN will become more 
popularly anchored in the medium (5-10 years) and long run, but it still remains to be 
seen. 
 
7.2: The main research question 
So far, we have seen that both Indonesia and Malaysia might be labelled 
“leaders” in the case of Myanmar, but perhaps not in the case of implementing AFTA. 
I have also concluded that while economy leads the way, security has traditionally 
been the more important issue, and thus respectively defines and hinders ASEAN 
integration. Moreover, I have argued that economy and economic security in the future 
might replace security and non-interference as the defining characteristic of ASEAN – 
especially after the Association realized its dependency upon Europe and the United 
States after the Asian crisis in 1997. I have also argued that it is the informal channels 
and mechanisms that ASEAN facilitates, that explain best how ASEAN diplomacy 
works, and how Indonesia and Malaysia approach their relations to their neighbours in 
Southeast Asia. Finally, I have cautiously anticipated an eventual turn to ASEAN as a 
two-level concept – one level where the heads of governments meet and negotiate and 
a second level where the national preferences are decided and which lends legitimacy 
to the respective heads of state. 
There is, however, a second part of the main research question to answer, namely 
“How are the two countries’ policies affected by their participation in ASEAN?” I 
believe that the findings presented above have already given some clues to the answer. 
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First and foremost, given the “informal” character of the relations between the 
ASEAN members, it is reasonable so assume that ASEAN has little direct influence 
over the affairs and policies of the two countries in question. The indirect influence, 
however, is formidable, especially with regard to the ASC and to the Myanmar Crisis. 
Given the level of tension that has existed between Malaysia and Indonesia at various 
stages over the years, much of the credit for the keeping of the peace and the peaceful 
settlement of such disputes must be given to ASEAN. It is also possible that the 
economic reality of sanctions from the EU and the US should ASEAN fail to properly 
deal with Myanmar, might cause ASEAN to take a new stand on Myanmar, thus 
breaking with the principle of non-interference. Were this to happen, we could perhaps 
see an Association that is less afraid of “interfering” in the domestic affairs of its 
members in the future. Of course, this depends on the wishes of the leading countries. 
In the economic sphere, ASEAN has more direct influence over its members. 
AFTA and the CEPT Scheme make certain requirements, which the countries have to 
fulfil within a given amount of time. The fact that Malaysia has agreed to relinquish its 
protection of the national car industry is a good indication of the direct influence of 
ASEAN in the economic sphere. Despite the apparent success of AFTA in removing 
intra-ASEAN tariffs and trade barriers, there are at least two important factors that 
undermine the significance of these measures. These are of course related to the low 
degree of intra-regional trade and the low degree of intra-regional FDI flows and 
stocks. The low, if stable, degree of intra-regional trade and FDI (around 20-25% 
intra-regional trade, while more fluctuating volatile for FDI flows) could indicate that 
the removal of intra-regional tariffs and NTBs might be expendable if it means 
increasing ASEAN’s strength in trade negotiations with extra-regional actors. The 
report made be Gaulier, Jean and Ünal-Kesenci of the French CEPII institute supports 
this. Their report indicates that Asia is the region in the world with the lowest degree 
of intra-regional trade, according to the regional trade index method. When intra-
regional trade is so low compared to extra-regional trade, it is not surprising that the 
ASEAN members might see it fit to open for free trade with their fellow ASEAN 
partners. And indeed, if this increases the share of intra-regional trade, so much the 
better. 
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7.3: Concluding remarks: The Road Ahead 
Since the early 1990s, ASEAN has initiated several measures aimed at regional 
integration both within the field of security and the field of economy. Economy has 
played a significant role, especially with its advances in tariff reductions and in the 
removal of borders in trade and investment terms. On the other hand, non-interference 
and fierce protection of national sovereignty and security have been among the factors 
blocking ASEAN security integration from developing from a security community to a 
security alliance. Similarly, non-interference has also been the reason why ASEAN 
has been bestowed with no supranational powers a la the European Union, which 
again effectively stops any attempts at making ASEAN into a deeper integration 
project. This lack of deep integration clearly limits the prospects for ASEAN to 
develop into a separate entity – something more than the sum of its parts. ASEAN is 
therefore still unable to issue any demands of Myanmar (or any other member) by 
itself. Thus, ASEAN only constitutes more or less a forum or framework in which its 
respective heads of governments can put their heads together. 
In the future, the need for ASEAN to act with a single voice will be greater than 
ever. Globalisation has already made the world a lot smaller. In Southeast Asia the 
European Union and the United States fight for economic dominance, Japan 
desperately tries to win back and defend its economic hegemony, while a rapidly rising 
China is viewed with a mixture of scepticism and eagerness. In the middle of this, 
being smaller in terms of economy, technology and population (except for Japan in the 
last respect), ASEAN must find a way to coexist. It needs to be able act with one 
voice, or else face the risk of becoming redundant. Critics predicted the death of 
ASEAN after the crisis in 97-98, but as stated by Mark Twain some time during the 
19th century: “The rumours of my death have been greatly exaggerated.” 
If ASEAN is to deepen and broaden in the future, it will have to expand both its 
institutional structure and the powers invested in them. This will require great efforts 
and sacrifices by each and every member, but in the end the effort hopefully will pay 
off. Also, it would require a softening of non-interference, or at least a way around it. 
It is my belief that it would greatly facilitate this process if especially Indonesia could 
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shake off its internal problems and resume its de facto leadership over ASEAN. Were 
Malaysia to add its voice to its archipelagic neighbour, the vision of “One Southeast 
Asia” would come much closer. Malaysia and Indonesia have traditionally been the 
strongest Pan-Asian supporters, and they could also have enough influence to make 
the other members listen very carefully. Still, as of now a deepening of the AFTA 
might be plausible. A solution of the Myanmar Crisis seems impossible still, unless 
non-interference is, at least temporarily, set aside.  
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